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Wyclif’s Trinitarian and  
Christological Theology
Stephen E. Lahey
1. Locating Wyclif the Theologian in his Oxford Environment
Anyone familiar with amateur photography can imagine standing 
in a darkroom, watching the slow resolution of a picture as it sits in 
its chemical bath. First the main outlines of the image emerge from 
a blank background, and only gradually do the details follow. Fre-
quently the content of the picture is only recognizable when all the 
details are clear, when what appear as large, oddly shaped objects re-
solve into distinct, recognizable ones. Such is the case with under-
standing of Wyclif’s earlier, theological works. Without a familiarity 
with the details of fourteenth-century Oxford theology, its main play-
ers and positions, and their complex understandings of the relation of 
logic to theology, the writings of one particular theologian are likely 
to confusing at best, recognizable only by broad outlines that mayor 
may not have anything to do with the actual positions he takes. While 
some treatises of his Summa de ente, such as De universalibus or De com-
posicione hominis might arguably be generally comprehensible apart 
from the mid-fourteenth century dialogue, others, notably De Trini-
tate, are not.1 
A study of Wyclif’s theology must consider a wide range of sub-
jects, including issues of philosophical theology like his discussion 
of the necessity of created action and the freedom of human will-
ing, his conception of how Being as such relates to the divine being 
1 It is a stretch to claim that De universalibus is comprehensible apart from the at-
mosphere in which it was written, but it at least articulates an ontological posi-
tion recognizable to those familiar with medieval arguments about universals. 
Professor Breck’s summary of the argument of his otherwise excellent edition 
of De Trinitate, is almost impenetrable from a theological standpoint, largely 
because scholarship had not yet caught up to the treatise’s content when he 
published it. See Johannis Wyclyf, Tractatus De Trinitate, ed. Allen duPont 
Breck (Colorado, 1962), pp. xxi-l. 
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and created being, and the nature of divine knowledge and willing. 
It would have to address Wyclif’s complex understanding of how di-
vine law relates to justice in creation with regards to the law of Mo-
ses, and more widely how the law of Christ applies in human domi-
nium relations. Wyclif’s ecclesiology and its ties to his understanding 
of the pastoral offices and the sacraments would need to be incorpo-
rated into the study, as orthopraxy figures very importantly in Wyc-
lif’s theological vision. Finally, Wyclif’s conception of the ontology of 
Scripture and how its truths must be understood and realized in the 
world would figure significantly in a study of his theology. If such a 
study is more imaginable now than it was a century ago, when the 
Wyclif Society edited most of his Latin works, this is because schol-
ars have been studying many of the topics listed with the care they 
require. This chapter will, I hope, contribute to that project by intro-
ducing two subjects essential to any Christian theology, namely, the 
nature of the Trinity and of the Incarnation.
Three treatises of the Summa de ente deserve our attention: De 
Trinitate, De composicione hominis, and De Incarnacione, all composed 
between 1370 and 1372. Scholars have noted these treatises’ likely 
function as Sentences commentaries, required of all candidates for 
the degree of a Doctorate in Theology. Such commentaries were 
generally also the place for taking up one’s lance against rival phil-
osophical and theological positions. So it will be important to see 
how Wyclif’s positions on how the three divine persons relate in one 
nature, and how two natures relate in the person of the Incarnate 
Word function as likely responses to the Sentences commentaries of 
earlier Oxford luminaries such as Adam Wodeham and Robert Hol-
cot. Wyclif envisioned his theology as a return to the orthodoxy of 
earlier figures such as Anselm, Augustine, and Robert Grosseteste, 
as is clear to anyone who has read him. These theologians endorsed 
a philosophical position more consonant with realism than with the 
conceptualism prized by many thinkers in early fourteenth-century 
Oxford. Wyclif expressly intended to show how ontological realism 
explicates the complex realities of the divine being and its assump-
tion of a human nature in these treatises, and so our interest is in 
understanding both how realism functions in his philosophical the-
ology of divine persons, and how his thought relates to that of his 
likely opponents.
In both the metaphysics of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, a 
universal functions as a nature. In the Trinity, the divine nature is the 
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universal, for which there are three particulars, namely the three per-
sons, each of whom is divine through their instantiation of Divinity. 
In the Incarnation, the creature Jesus Christ is the result of hypostatic 
union of the Word, God the Son, with the nature Humanity, a univer-
sal by community, in the physical body of the man Jesus. In Christ, 
the part that normally is played by the created soul in a human be-
ing is played by Humanity, although this does not mean that Christ 
lacked a soul of any kind. In both the Trinity and the Incarnation, it 
will turn out that Wyclif’s conception that the aggregate being arising 
out of the union of two distinct beings is itself something bearing on-
tological weight plays a part.
2. De Trinitate: The Divine Nature as Universal,  
the Divine Person as Particular
2.1. Situating De Trinitate
While much scholarship remains to be done, we can now iden-
tify at least some of the arguments to which De Trinitate contributes. 
This allows us to do more than describe it as what a realist theolo-
gian would say about the logical problems inherent to the doctrine 
of the Trinity. A key problem will be to identify theologians, or if 
not, positions connected to theologians against whom Wyclif argues; 
simply to refer to his opponents as “the Moderni” is by no means ad-
equate, for everyone engaged in theology during the period fit that 
bill. It was not until the Council of Constance that the term was used 
especially to refer to the Ockhamist position.2 Wyclif himself only 
occasionally names his opponents throughout his works, and not at 
all in De Trinitate; he uses the term “Moderni” very generally in this 
treatise, and includes among the antiqui everyone from Augustine to 
Scotus. At present, there are no published editions of Sentences com-
mentaries of Wyclif’s contemporaries, theologians such as Nicholas 
Aston, Richard Brinkley, Johannes Klenkok, and Uthred of Boldon, 
and relatively few of his predecessors in the decades before the 
2 Neil Ward Gilbert, “Ockham, Wyclif, and the ‘Via Moderna’” in Antiqui et Mod-
erni: Traditionsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia Band 9 
(Berlin, 1974) pp. 85-125. 
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Black Death.3 Until more editions are available, our understanding 
of Wyclif’s arguments will remain limited to broad outlines of po-
sitions. We may be able to guess at details, for instance, why Wyc-
lif emphasizes ontology and speaks less about epistemic justifica-
tion, but for the present, our picture of Wyclif’s theology continues 
to emerge. 
Thomson dates this treatise to 1370; Robson categorizes the trea-
tise as the fourth tractate of the second book of the Summa de ente, fol-
lowing De intellectione Dei, De scientia Dei, et De volucione Dei. The trac-
tates consequent are De Ydeis, De potencia Dei productiva ad extra. In his 
“Wyclif and the Augustinian Tradition” Gordon Leff views the trea-
tise as valuable as a touchstone for Wyclif’s “original theological po-
sition,” as it was prior to the more combative treatises of the Summa 
Theologie.4 He describes the main theme of the treatise to be that rea-
son is a positive aid to faith, the function of which is to provide ev-
idence of the divine Trinity through the signs available in creation. 
By providing fallen man the wherewithal to recover sufficient under-
standing of the world to appreciate revealed truth, reason comple-
ments faith. Likewise, Leff notes Wyclif’s argument that some element 
of faith is evident in every act of knowing. In every act of knowledge 
that does not entail direct experience of the thing known, a degree of 
faith is necessary in the evidence presented to the individual knower 
for the evidence to be believed. This Leff characterizes as Wyclif seek-
ing “to show where faith and reason converge, while reserving for 
faith what is distinctive to it. By making it accessible to natural ex-
perience in its different modes he has allowed reason a far fuller role 
in theology than the majority of medieval thinkers have.”5 Leff notes 
that Wyclif exceeds thirteenth century notions of natural theology 
by arguing that human reason can demonstrate God’s triune nature 
3 See William Courtenay, Schools and Scholar in Fourteenth Century England (Princ-
eton, 1987) for an introduction to the bibliographic information available. J. 
A. Robson’s Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1961) remains the best 
introduction to the milieu in which Wyclif wrote. I have made use of Robert 
Holcot, O.P. In Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Quaestiones (Frankfurt, 1967; a re-
print of the 1518 edition), Adam Wodeham, Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum 
Sententiarum, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gal, (St. Bonaventure, 1990), and 
Michael Dunning’s as yet unpublished edition of Richard FitzRalph’s Utrum 
mens humana sit ymago Trinitatis increate, (Sent. Liber 1, Questio 5). 
4 Gordon Leff, ‘‘Wyclif and the Augustinian Tradition,” Medievalia et Humanistica, 
ed. Paul M. Clogan (Cleveland, 1970), pp. 29-39. 
5 Leff, “Wyclif and the Augustinian Tradition,” p. 36. 
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sufficiently to convince any rational criteria, given an understanding 
of the authoritative witness of revealed truth. But to contrast Wyclif 
with Aquinas and Scotus on the one hand, and Ockham on the other, 
as Leff appears to be doing, is to look past the tremendous amount of 
theology done in Oxford from the 1320s to the 1360s. Leff’s descrip-
tion makes Wyclif appear to be a weird proto-rationalist, or perhaps 
an idealist of some sort, neither of which is accurate.
A good approach for understanding what a theologian thinks re-
garding reason’s limits in matters of faith, and for seeing how he en-
visions a formal theology ought to proceed would be to investigate 
his Commentary on the Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae of Peter Lom-
bard.6 This is true, at any rate, for an identifiable period in Oxford. 
Before the 1280s, only those of Richard Fishacre, Robert Kilwardby, 
and Richard Rufus of Cornwall survive.7 The period between Ock-
ham’s lectures on the Sentences in 1317–1319 and Bradwardine’s De 
causa Dei in 1344 has been described as a Golden Age of theology in 
Oxford, and Sentences Commentaries abound from figures of this pe-
riod, notably those of Adam Wodeham (d.1358) among the Francis-
cans, and Robert Holcot (d. 1349) among the Dominicans.8 The last 
decade of this period is particularly rich, for Wyclif’s immediate in-
tellectual forbears, including Richard Brinkeley O.F.M., Richard Fitz-
Ralph, and Thomas Bradwardine, leave record of some activity with 
the Sententiae.9 But after 1344, things appear to have changed. Com-
6 See Marcia Colish, Peter Lombard (Leiden, 1994). See also Philipp W. Rosemann, 
Peter Lombard (Oxford, 2004). 
7 See Rega Wood, “Early Oxford Theology,” in Medieval Commentaries on the Sen-
tences of Peter Lombard: Current Research, ed. G. R. Evans (Leiden, 2002), pp. 
289-343. 
8 See Chris Schabel, “Oxford Franciscans after Ockham,” in Medieval Commentar-
ies on the Sentences, pp. 359-77. For Wodeham, see Courtenay, Adam Wodeham 
(Leiden, 1978); for Holcot, the best treatment remains Fritz Hoffman, Die the-
ologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot (Münster, 1972). 
For bibliography for both, see A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. 
Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Malden, Mass., 2003), pp. 84-5, 610. 
9 See Raymond Edwards, “Themes and Personalities in Sentence Commentar-
ies at Oxford in the 1330s,” in Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences, pp. 379-
93. Edwards emphasizes the centrality of biblical exegesis and preaching in 
the choices and approaches of commentators in this period, which should be 
borne in mind for Wyclif’s own approach. For a general outline of the top-
ics discussed in FitzRalph’s Sentence commentary, see Gordon Leff, Richard 
FitzRalph Commentator of the Sentences, (Manchester, 1963). For Thomas Brad-
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mentaries no longer encompass as many of Lombard’s distinctiones as 
they had previously, tending instead to address several large ques-
tions.10 In addressing one or two questions where previously the com-
mentator might have examined a dozen, the post-1344 commenta-
tor took the opportunity to engage in analysis of much greater detail. 
Further, whereas earlier the tendency had been to refer to one’s oppo-
nents as “quidam,” by this period it was much more common for one’s 
opponents to be named, and his works accurately cited.11
The realist position was most dramatically made by Bradwardine 
in his De causa Dei, but it was generally the tenor of Oxford metaphys-
ics in the 1360s, an articulation of the responses to Ockham made by 
Walter Burley (d. 1344) and Walter Chatton (d. 1343). Wyclif’s posi-
tion in De Trinitate appears to be a response to the kinds of positions 
held by Adam Wodeham and Robert Holcot, who both denied the in-
clusion of theology among the sciences. The vigor of Adam Wode-
ham’s rejection of Walter Chatton’s position in his Sentences com-
mentary [I.d.1 q.2] might lead one to imagine that Wyclif’s position 
is a direct response to Wodeham’s, on Chatton’s behalf.12 Given the 
lack of edited Sentences commentaries of the period following Wode-
ham and Holcot at Oxford, it is impossible at this point to prove or 
disprove such an hypothesis; the best we can do in this discussion is 
to hold Holcot and Wodeham as proponents of the kind of position 
against which Wyclif argued.
While scholarship has made some headway in the past two de-
cades in understanding the Commentary tradition of this period, 
there remains no serious attempt to include Wyclif in this tradition. 
Wyclif certainly would have lectured on the Sententiae in the course 
wardine, see Jean-François Genest, “Les Premiers Écrits Théologiques de 
Bradwardine: Textes Inédits et Découvertes Récentes,” in Medieval Commentar-
ies on the Sentences, pp. 395-421, and “Le de Futuris Contingentibus de Thomas 
Bradwardine,” in Recherches augustinienne 14 (1979), 249-336. For what remains 
of Richard Brinkeley’s Sentence Commentary, see Zénon Kaluza, “L’oeuvre 
théologique de Richard Brinkley, OFM,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Litté-
raire du Moyen Age 56 (1986), 169-273. 
10 Paul J. J. M. Bakker and Chris Schabel, “Sentences Commentaries of the Later 
Fourteenth Century,” Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences, pp. 426-64. 
11 Damasus Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century” Augustin-
iana 6 (1956), 146-274; William Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, esp. pp. 327-55. 
12 For Wodeham’s special animus against Chatton, see Adam de Wodeham’s Lec-
tura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum, vol. 1, ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon 
Gal (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1990), pp. 12-16. 
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of his studies, and demonstrates familiarity with Lombard through-
out his works.13 Aside from Robson’s suggestion that Book 2 of the 
Summa de ente contains the body of Wyclif’s “lost” Commentary, the 
only reference to Wyclif’s having published anything on the Sententiae 
can be found in Harris’s 1886 introduction to De benedicta Incarnacione, 
wherein he endorses an unknown cataloger’s account of the contents 
of Oriel 15, in which that treatise is included.14 I believe that Rob-
son’s suggestion is correct; many of the criteria for post-1344 Com-
mentaries are met in De Trinitate. The treatise is rich with references 
to specific works of authorities such as Augustine, Anselm, and Gros-
seteste, as well as to more recent luminaries such as Aquinas and Sco-
tus. References more recent than the late thirteenth century are almost 
non-existent, though; FitzRalph and Bradwardine are the only figures 
mentioned by name. It is difficult to imagine Wyclif formulating the 
arguments of the Summa de ente’s treatises without specific opponents 
in mind, but his references to them are restricted to “doctors of signs” 
or “a certain doctor.”
The body of the treatise appears to wander from topic to topic, but 
the argument can best be understood as extended commentary on 
Distinction 5 of Book I, “Whether the divine essence generates the Son 
or was generated by the Father.” The most fully developed section 
of the treatise is Chapter 16, in which Wyclif engages in recognizably 
scholastic formal reasoning addressing this question, referring twice 
to Lombard’s treatment of it. His argument rests on points made in 
the previous fifteen chapters, ranging from the relation of reasoning 
to faith in the doctrine of the Trinity through consideration of the for-
mal distinction of Scotus, and the right relation of language to object 
and idea in such a discussion. While Leff and others have emphasized 
Wyclif’s reliance on Augustine’s De Trinitate for the doctrinal content, 
Scotus’s Sentences Commentary figures importantly in key points of 
the argument.
Wyclif’s approach focuses more on ontology and the signification 
that underlies theological truth, suggestive of a desire to order theol-
ogy and philosophy like that of twelfth-century theologians such as 
Anselm or the Victorines. In contrast, Richard FitzRalph shows much 
13 H. B. Workman, John Wyclif: A Study of the English Medieval Church, 2 vols. (Ox-
ford, 1926), 1:96-7. 
14 See Robson, pp. 134-5, also W. Thomson, p. 15. Thomson notes further that 
Wyclif structured the Trialogus according to Lombard’s Sententiae. 
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less interest in this, at least as regards formal trinitarian theology.15 
De Trinitate’s twentieth century editor, Allen DuPont Breck, describes 
it as “not a pioneering work in the sense that it strikes at the heart of 
any doctrine or practice with something basically new to say.”16 He 
is right, for Wyclif’s description of the Trinity does not diverge from 
a fairly standard Scotistic depiction of three persons formally distinct 
from one another, identical with the Divine Essence. But it would be 
premature to suppose that this makes the treatise valuable only as 
a set-piece within Wyclif’s Sentences Commentary; De Trinitate may 
well be a part of Wyclif’s attempt to put Bradwardine’s De causa Dei 
on firmer metaphysical and theological ground, and his explanation 
of the relation of faith and reason is an important part of that enter-
prise. Bradwardine’s efforts were very much directed against thinkers 
such as Holcot, his associate in the de Bury circle, and Adam Wode-
ham.17 In his 1993 study of Holcot, Leonard Kennedy comments that 
Bradwardine’s anti-Pelagian arguments lacked noticeable effect; if De 
Trinitate is in fact directed against these thinkers’ positions, as I be-
lieve it is, the effect was noticeable indeed.18 
2.2. Faith and Reason as the Starting Point
De Trinitate is divisible into four sections. In the first, Wyclif con-
siders the relation of faith and reason, and explores an analogy useful 
in understanding the distinction of persons within the Trinity. In the 
second, he considers the relations between the divine persons, and 
the way language limits our understanding of those relations. Next, 
he examines the syllogism Wodeham considers to be valid about the 
Father and the Son being of the same essence, and uses arguments 
about universals, reference, and the formal distinction to extricate the 
faithful from Wodeham’s mistake. Finally, Wyclif presents a disquisi-
tion on generation within the divine being that can only be the fruit of 
15 I am grateful to Michael Dunning for the use of his unpublished edition of 
FitzRalph’s Sentence commentary, the use of which has greatly assisted me by 
filling out the brief picture of his commentary on Book 1 given in Leff, Richard 
FitzRalph. 
16 Breck, 1962, p. viii. 
17 See Heiko Oberman, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine: A Fourteenth Century Au-
gustinian (Utrecht, 1957), pp. 43-8. 
18 Leonard Kennedy, The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, Fourteenth Century Skeptic 
(Lewiston, 1993), p. 140. 
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his commentary on Bk. I, Distinction 5. The last chapter considers the 
spiration of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, summarizing the ar-
guments levied against “the Greeks” who reject the filioque clause in 
the Nicene Creed.
The treatise’s beginning provides a strong indicator that De Trin-
itate represents the beginning of Wyclif’s Sentence Commentary. 
Rather than beginning as Augustine did in his De Trinitate, with 
a brief discussion as to the utility of theological speculation and its 
place within the life of the faithful, the first four chapters of Wyclif’s 
treatise stoutly defend the position that an act of faith is involved in 
every act of reasoning, making faith absolutely central to any form 
of reasoning. Readers unfamiliar with the Sentence Commentary tra-
dition that had developed in Oxford in the early fourteenth-century 
might be forgiven for wondering why Wyclif expends such energy ar-
guing for a rational analysis of matters of the faith. In 1317 William 
Ockham had begun his own lectures on the Sentences, in which he ar-
gued that natural reason is ultimately unable to encompass the mys-
teries of the faith with the security and extent that his predecessors 
Aquinas and Scotus had imagined possible. While he stopped short 
of holding that faith and reason were two separate spheres between 
which fruitful dialogue is possible, not all who were to follow were as 
cautious.19 During the two decades that were to follow, Oxford theo-
logians vigorously examined the possibility that theology really isn’t 
even a science at all. Most notable of these were Adam Wodeham and 
Robert Holcot, and William Crathorn.
Adam Wodeham, Ockham’s student and friend, attacked the ar-
guments of his fellow Franciscan Walter Chatton with notable vigor. 
Chatton had argued, as Wyclif would, that a return to the safety of 
theological tradition and scriptural foundation would best serve the 
needs of the day.20 Wodeham argued against the possibility of us-
19 See Alfred Freddoso, “Ockham on Faith and Reason,” The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Ockham, ed. Paul Vincent Spade (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 326-49. See Wil-
liam Ockham, Summae Logicae Pars Prima Tertiae Partis, c. 1: “Et sic articuli fidei 
nec sunt principia demonstrationis nec conclusiones, nec sunt probabiles, quia 
omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime sapientibus apparent falsi, et hoc accipiendo 
sapientes pro sapientibus mundi et praecise innitentibus rationi naturali, quia 
illo modo accipitur ‘sapiens’ in descriptione probabilis.” 
20 See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 265-6; also Gracia pp. 674-5. The influ-
ence of Chatton on Wyclif deserves much fuller consideration than is possible 
here, where Wyclif’s more immediate opponents are of interest. See Reportatio 
in I Sent. Dist. 1-9 and Dist. 10-48, ed. See Girard Etzkorn and Joseph Wey (To-
ronto, 2002). 
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ing the fruits of natural reasoning to broaden our understanding of 
the divine, rejecting as many of Chatton’s attempts at natural theol-
ogy as was necessary to emphasize this impossibility. While a con-
clusion reliably attained using one form of science may seem appli-
cable in another field, it would be foolhardy to assume that this holds 
across all the rational endeavors we suppose are sciences. We may 
presume that two diverse lines of argument lead to the same conclu-
sion, as in the famous five ways Aquinas uses to demonstrate God’s 
existence, but “diverse sciences do not prove formally the same con-
clusion through the same medium, unless by mendacity.”21 Scientific 
reasoning’s ability, for example, to construct arguments demonstrat-
ing the existence of an infinite being may entice one to suppose that 
it can demonstrate God’s existence, but the God it constructs is ulti-
mately nothing in comparison to the God of theology. There is no pos-
sibility of reason establishing the falsity of the apparently valid syllo-
gism “This thing is the Father; this same thing is the Son; therefore the 
Father is the same as the Son,” for by Aristotle’s rules, the conclusion 
follows neatly from the premises. “And thus unless through our faith 
it were known that one thing is three things, we would believe firmly 
the aforesaid sophism to have been well argued.“22 
Robert Holcot’s position was that what is evident as scientific 
knowledge is born from demonstrative arguments; no faith is in-
volved in the process. His argument is that theology could only be 
considered a science if it conformed to one of the three senses in which 
the term scientia is understood. In the broadest sense, it is firm adhe-
sion to the truth, and in this sense theology is a science. But the ques-
tion of the basis for that adhesion then arises. If the assent is based 
in evident knowledge of some truth grounded in empirical data, or 
in necessary first principles, then one cannot include theology among 
the sciences, for no viator can claim empirical knowledge nor intuitive 
comprehension of supernatural truths as necessary first principles.23
21 Adam de Wodeham, Lectura Secunda in librum Primum Sententiae 1.3.12, p. 
1:247: “Et ideo ad variationem mediorum secundum speciem variatur actus 
sciendi secundum speciem, et diversae scientiae non probant formaliter ean-
dem conclusionem per idem medium, nisi mendicando.” 
22 Ibid., 2.1.13, p. 2:25: “Et ideo nisi per fidem nobis innotuisset quod una res est 
tres res, credidissemus firmiter sophismata praedicta bona fuissa argumenta.” 
23 See Holcot’s denial of the possibility of establishing God’s existence through 
unaided reason in J. T. Muckle, C.S.B., “Utrum Theologia Sit Scientia A Quod-
libetal Question of Robert Holcot, O.P.,” Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958), 127-53, 
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But the matter is more complex than this; Holcot is not suggest-
ing that formal reasoning has no place in theological investigations. 
While he is clear that the Catholic ought accept as true on author-
ity of Scripture or the Church propositions that might otherwise 
be rejected, one can—and in some cases must—use logic to investi-
gate theological statements and arguments. With heretics, it is best 
to stick to analysis of the forms of arguments they use, and leave the 
divergence in content to ecclesiastic authority Theologians must be 
well versed in logic, though, as sophistic arguments frequently arise 
that require careful parsing. In some cases, he continues, good rea-
soning can break down when addressing particularly difficult sub-
jects, as with the nature of the Trinity. The syllogism “this thing is 
the Father,” “this same thing is the Son,” therefore “the Father is the 
Son” is perfectly acceptable by Aristotle’s reasoning, yet the conse-
quence cannot be accepted, even if the premises are. Understanding 
the limits of human logic, he suggests, is one of the first requirements 
of theological investigation.24
Another Dominican, William Crathorn (fl. 1330–1331) has recently 
gained some scholarly attention for his unique epistemological posi-
tions. In his Commentary on Book I of the Sentences, he argues that 
our knowledge of perceptible objects arises from our perception of 
sensible species, which have all the characteristics of the objects they 
represent. That is, the sensible species of a cat that I see has, just as 
the cat does, a tail, white fur, a pink nose, and so on. Holcot thought 
Crathorn’s position was ridiculous, but given its similarity to that ar-
gued by philosophers three hundred years hence, it has recently gar-
nered scholarly interest.25 Crathorn’s influence on Wyclif is likely 
to have been noteworthy, despite the two decades separating them, 
given the many subjects on which they directly disagreed. Crathorn’s 
In Primum Librum Sententiarum follows Lombard’s first book only 
at p. 144: “non habemus ab aliquo philosopho demonstrative probatum quod 
aliquis angelus est, neque de deo, neque de aliquo incorporeo.” 
24 Quodlibet 87, “Utrum haec est concedenda: Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanc-
tus,” in Hester Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason: Three Questions on the 
Nature of God by Robert Holcot OP (Toronto, 1983), pp. 34-36. 
25 See “On the possibility of infallible knowledge,” In Sent. Q. 1, R. Pasnau, 
transl., in R. Pasnau, ed., Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, 
vol. 3, Mind and Knowledge (Cambridge 2002), pp. 245-301. See also Gracia and 
Noone, pp. 692-3. 
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nominally, ranging across a host of issues that would, later occupy 
Wyclif’s attention. In addition to extended discussions of mereology, 
indivisibles, and continuous motion, he lists five kinds of Univer-
sals, including things universal by causality, by perfections, and by 
similitude, but explains that logically speaking, the only real Univer-
sals are signs or representations of things.26 He is in agreement with 
Wodeham, Holcot, and Ockham that human reason cannot estab-
lish the existence of God as we understand the divine through reve-
lation. “I say then that it cannot be known by us in this life properly 
said that there are not many gods, although according to the truth of 
things there are not many gods, but only one God who is Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.”27
One might conclude that by the 1330s, theology had become a pal-
lid version of what it had been twenty years before. The approaches 
of Wodeham and Holcot predominated at Oxford in the years be-
fore Black Death, and Courtenay notes that “theology as a science, its 
practical or speculative nature, and its subject” had generally ceased 
to be a matter of discussion.28 Had a general air of skepticism set-
tled over the university? While John Mirecourt and Nicholas of Au-
trecourt were to be condemned in Paris in 1347, their condemna-
tions were based less on a fear of the possibility of a theology-killing 
skepticism in their views and more on personal and political differ-
ences with the theology faculty there.29 Skepticism was not the prob-
lem; change in interests and methodology, more than anything else, 
seems to have led pre-1349 Oxford to follow Wodeham’s and Hol-
cot’s approach regarding theology. Even thinkers one might expect 
to have opposed the separation of theology from the sciences seem to 
have occupied themselves with other concerns; Bradwardine’s mon-
umental De causa Dei is predicated on the idea that philosophy and 
26 Q. 11, pp. 153-154; and at p. 182: “Iam ostendum est quod universale non sit 
res extra animam, sicut aliqui imaginatur,” in Fritz Hoffmann, Crathorn Quäes-
tionen zum Ersten Sentenzenbuch, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und The-
ologie des Mittelalters NF 29 (Munster, 1988). 
27 Ibid., Q.4, pp. 305-6: “Dico igitur non potest sciri a nobis in vita ista scientia 
proprie dicta quod non sint plures dii, licet secundum rei veritatem non sint 
plures dii, sed unus deus tantum, qui est Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.” 
28 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 255. 
29 J. M. M. H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200-1400 (Phil-
adelphia, 1998), pp. 73-89. 
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logic can defend theological truth, but he does not go out of his way 
to establish this.30
Wyclif does not appear to have been the first to resurrect the is-
sue, though; in the early 1350s, the Franciscan Richard Brinkley ad-
dressed the question “Whether the Christian sect depends on faith 
or reason as its foundation” in his Sentences Commentary. Had Brin-
kley’s Sentences Commentaries survived, we would be in a position to 
compare the force of his arguments against those of Wodeham, but all 
that remains appears to be an abbrevatio prepared by Etienne Gaudet, 
a Parisian scholar in the 1360s.31 Here, Brinkley is reported as arguing 
against philosophers who believe “that man should believe nothing, 
unless what ostensive reason is naturally able to conclude for itself to 
be the truth. And because they do not know how to prove evidently 
that there is another life, they establish for themselves this present 
one on its own.“32 Brinkley argues that man can, by evident reason, 
infer that human life is itself ordered to another life than the present. 
Do other sects (i.e. religions) have differing conceptions of how rea-
son ought guide the faithful? Brinkley argues that every sect believes 
its foundational principles to be the truth, and uses these principles 
to construct rational arguments in favor of their sect. Unfortunately, 
what we lack are his conceptions of the interrelation of faith and rea-
son that support these assertions. Gaudet reports him as having be-
gun the question by arguing that the human will determines what the 
intellect will decide upon, and as having then presented arguments 
against this position. It is very tempting, given Wyclif’s own argu-
ments, to fill in the blanks in Brinkley’s question, and have him hold 
that there is an element of faith in every act of reasoning. This would 
allowing us to recognize the compatibility of faith and reason as both 
30 De causa Dei praefatio, pp. 5-6: “Indagare siquidem causas naturales entium et 
propinquas, difficulatatem non modicam continet et laborem; quanto magis 
totam universitatem harum causarum, volatu mentis corruptela corporis ag-
gravate transcendere, et usque ad impenetrabile penetralecausarum supernat-
uralium, altissimarum, inaccessibilum et invisibilum penetrare, ipsasque ve-
lut nycticoracis oculo caligante perspicaciter intueri …“ See also Oberman, 
Thomas Bradwardine, pp. 22-7. 
31 See Kaluza, “L’oeuvre théologique de Richard Brinkley, OFM.” 
32 Kaluza, ibid., p. 227: “Circa quod est opinio philosophorum quod homo ni-
hil debet credere, nisi quod ostensiva ratione naturaliter poterit sibi concludi 
esse verum. Et quia aliam vitam concludere evidenter nesciunt, praesentem 
pro fine sibi stauunt.” 
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matters fit for scientific exploration, as Wyclif was to argue. But in the 
abbrevatio of the question that follows, Gaudet describes Brinkley as 
“touching upon the incompossibility of reason and faith,” which sug-
gests that he followed his Franciscan predecessors in seeing the two 
as separate. So while Wyclif was likely influenced by Brinkley’s logic, 
he probably wasn’t influenced by his understanding of the relation of 
reason to faith.33 
A more notable connection can be made between Wyclif and Nich-
olas Aston, who was a fellow at Queen’s College from 1350, and 
Chancellor of the University from 1359 to 1361.34 Aston was, like Wyc-
lif, extremely sensitive to the centrality of logical analysis of language 
in theological argument. Like Wyclif, he demonstrated no interest in 
epistemology, preferring instead to apply philosophical logic to on-
tological problems without reference to the questions of knowability 
and certainty that occupied theologians in the 1320s and 1330s. More 
importantly, Aston followed Burley in arguing for the reality of Uni-
versals, and again like Wyclif, articulated an approach directly chal-
lenging those who would hold that truth lies in propositions, not in 
things. “Aston does indeed have a very strict definition of truth, for 
he has identified the truth of any proposition, syllogism, or argument 
with God.“35 For our discussion, Aston is most notable for having for-
mulated a proof for God’s existence in response to what he saw as a 
logically confused argument Bradwardine had made in De causa Dei 
I.1.36 Bradwardine’s argument, itself a variant of Aquinas’s third ar-
gument in Summa theologiae Ia Q.2 a.3, from the possible to the nec-
essary, fails, Aston argues, because it fumbles on possibility. Despite 
its supporters, the argument cannot be recognized as valid. The fal-
33 “Et tangitur de incompossibilitate scientiae et fidei … deinde respondetur ad 
quasdam rationes seu argumenta quae videntur probare oppositum quaestio-
nis ex incompossibilitate fidei et scientifici assensus.” from Utrum regulae sectae 
Christi et eius propria principia per se sufficient ad aliquam conclusionem mere theo-
logicam scientifice cognoscendam, Ibid. p. 229. 
34 See Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, pp. 333-46; Zénon Kaluza, “L’Oeuvre 
Théologique de Nicolas Agton,” Archives D’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire au 
Moyen Age, 48 (1978), 45–82. Joel L. Bendee, Nicholas Aston: A Study in Oxford 
Thought after the Black Death (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1979) con-
tains the fullest discussion of Aston’s life and thought, as well as an edition of 
eight questions from Aston’s Sentences  Commentary. 
35 Bender, p. 183; art. 4, 1. 519-22, in Bender, p. 422: “Ideo dico quod consequentiae 
bonae et formali, sillogismo bono, vel argumento bono, vel propositioni cuius 
contradictorium contradictionem includit, nihil in re correspondet nisi Deus …“ 
36 Bradwardine, De causa Dei 1.1, p. 2B, also I.11, p. 198D. 
Wy cL i f’S tr i n i ta r i an an d ch r iS to L o g i c aL th e oL o g y 141
sigraphicus [literally, mistake-writer] who jeers at such arguments 
would rightly assert that Bradwardine’s argument allows for a con-
tingency to God’s existence that is not commensurate with revealed 
truth. Rather than pursue Aston’s argument, it is sufficient to note 
that Aston’s extended discussion gives evidence of a shift in interest 
in Oxford in the 1350s, back to subject matter in formal theology con-
sonant with late thirteenth-century thought. This was likely strongly 
influenced by Bradwardine; following the Black Death, arguments 
for God’s existence were once again on the docket at Oxford. If As-
ton’s falsigraphicus is related to those Wyclif would later call “doctors 
of signs,” then it is clear that Wyclif’s theological positions were very 
much in step with those of his fellows at Oxford. 
We can know confusedly that God’s existence is demonstrable, 
Wyclif begins, and that the triune nature is recognizable as a result of 
this demonstration, but can we know God as the blessed experience in 
the divine vision?37 When human reason establishes God’s existence, 
it also establishes the triune nature of the divine essence, even if the 
demonstrator is unaware of this feat. Authorities such as Anselm, Au-
gustine, the Victorines, and Grosseteste all argue that the Trinity is 
evident through recognition of trinities in creatures, which serve as 
natural signs by which human reason may deduce syllogistically the 
divine Trinity.38 This is effectively described in Liber de causis, propo-
sition 6, which says that sensible effects brought about by secondary 
causes make us stammeringly to name God in His causes.39 One can 
37 De Trinitate, 1, p. 1. See De Actibus Anime, pars secunda 3, pp. 107/35–108/21: 
“[Q]uod deum esse est primum notum a quocunque cognoscente, non tamen 
est explicite cognoscibile, nisi a re racionali …“ 
38 Peter Lombard, Sententiae 1.3.1. In FitzRalph’s commentary on the Sentences 
1.5: “Whether the human mind is an image of the uncreated Trinity,” he ar-
gues that the mind’s inability to understand the uncreated Trinity militates 
against this, but concedes that on Augustine’s authority in De Trinitate, 14 c.15 
it can be argued that the mind’s ability to worship and participate in uncre-
ated Wisdom. “That mind is image of God for which it is receptive and can be 
a participant.” The remainder of FitzRalph’s commentary addresses real dis-
tinction between memory, understanding and will, between the acts of these 
powers, particularly between acts of cognition and of memory, and between 
acts of cognition and willing. Wyclif does not appear to have made use of this 
in his argument in De Trinitate. 
39 “The first cause transcends description. Languages fail in describing it only be-
cause of the description of its being. For the first cause is above every cause 
and is described only through the second causes which are illumined by the 
light of the first cause.” Prop. 6, Liber de Causis, in St. Thomas Aquinas Com-
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summarize the argument much as one argues from motion to prime 
mover. We recognize that the soul in creatures is composed of a tri-
une nature, in which memory, reason, and will define the singular es-
sence. This phenomenon, like motion, demands a like, three-fold in-
telligence that is itself necessary and immutable. Therefore, God has a 
three-fold nature.40
Augustine’s example should be our guide, Wyclif explains. His ar-
guments show how reason allows us to recognize the divine truths 
woven into creation, but in each case the faith must serve as founda-
tional. “This is generally said, that no one can assent to this deduc-
tion [of the three-fold divine nature from perceived created trinities] 
without faith, and so it is not merely natural, and is not demonstrated 
in the natural light.”41 But if faith is the foundation, is it not then the 
case that demonstration through natural reasoning is impossible? All 
reasoning demands some sort of non-rational assent, Wyclif argues, 
either before or outside of the reasoning process, to conditions that 
serve as evidence for the reasoning to take place. Learning to read, or 
to speak, requires a degree of faith in the teacher. The absence of the 
light of faith infused in the mind allows one to give assent to many 
ideas, but in each case, the mind craves evidence of some kind. Testi-
mony of authority counts as such even in matters otherwise neutral, 
so assent can be given in these matters from the authority of scripture 
or teaching that will be, in light of divine reality, rationally clear to 
all. Truth is manifested in three kinds of light: divine nature or super-
natural disposition, the light of reason or some other created power, 
mentary of the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent Guagliardo O.P., Charles R. Hess, 
O.P., Richard Taylor (Washington, 1996, p. 45). Compare to Wyclif’s affirma-
tion of impossibility of human language referring to God in De Incarnacione 7, 
p. 115/15-21. On this topic, see the discussion of analogy and God-talk below. 
40 De Trinitate 1, pp. 1–3. Contrast with Adam Wodeham, Sententiae 1, D.2, Q.1.14, 
p. 29/69–75: “Although in the truth of things, ‘God exists’ bears along with it 
‘the Trinity exists’, nevertheless the soundness of this consequence is not ev-
ident … this term ‘God’ and likewise this term ‘prime mover’ in these prop-
ositions supposit for the Trinity, but this is not evident. And thus it does not 
follow that the Trinity’s being might be proven evidently from creatures …“ 
Also, contrast with William Crathorn, Q.7 Utrum omnis creatura rationalis sit 
imago trinitatis, where he argues that while in the powers of the soul there is an 
image of God, it is mistaken to conclude from this that the created being gives 
evidence of the Trinity of divine being. See Hoffmann, Crathorn, pp. 331–51. 
41 De Trinitate 1, p. 3: “Hic dicitur communiter, quod nemo potest sine fide prima 
assentire isti deduccioni, et ideo non est mere naturalis, et sic non demonstra-
tur in lumine naturali.” 
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and the light of faith in universal truths that are not evident to natural 
light.42 All can converge in the human mind to allow one to give as-
sent to a truth of faith.
Later in his life, Wyclif makes much the same argument at the be-
ginning of his instruction on the Trinity in Trialogus, where he has 
his foil Pseustis argue a simplified version of the Ockhamist position. 
His champion Phronesis responds, “It is impossible for the faithful or 
the heretic to know something, unless they know it fundamentally 
through faith; because just as nobody knows letters—that one is A, 
the next B, and so of other—unless they believe, so nobody by their 
senses knows anything sensible, unless first truth speaks and teaches 
that, that a thing is sensible in one way or in another.”43 We do not 
degrade natural deduction simply because we give our assent to faith 
to augment that reasoning process. Further, faith is not judged to be 
better relative to the wealth of evidence available; the faith of a rich 
man with a Bible is not superior to that of a poor man without one. 
Not all acts of faith result in immediate understanding. Sometimes we 
believe something, yet never understand it, while in others, we come 
to an understanding immediately on giving assent to it, and in still 
others, what is believed is only understood after thought. This shows 
that not all faiths are of a kind.
But are they always present in any act of knowledge? And if so, 
and if faith is a virtuous qualitative habitus, which all theologians rec-
ognize to be a theological virtue, can we know anything without the 
assistance of grace, which is necessary for any theological virtue?44 
Wyclif is not forthcoming in his position on the place of illumina-
tion in knowledge here; we must deduce his allegiance to Augustine, 
Grosseteste, and Bonaventure. Their position was that every act of un-
derstanding entails the divine illumination of the mind, an active in-
volvement of the light of Truth in each case of our apprehension of 
the truth. Aquinas and Scotus limited the need for this illumination 
42 De Trinitate 1, p. 5. Wyclif argues that just as sunlight is to moonlight, so is su-
pernatural light to the light of natural reason. See De Trinitate, p. 6. 
43 Trialogus 1.6, ed. Gotthard Lechler (Oxford, 1869), p. 55: “Impossible est fi-
delem vel haereticum quidquam cognoscere, nisi per fidem fundamentali-
ter illud cognoscat; quia sicut nemo cognoscit literas, quod una est A, reliqua 
B, et sic de ceteris, nisi credat: sic nemo sensu cognoscit quodcunque sensi-
ble, nisi prima veritas illud dicat et doceat, quod illud sensibile sit illud vel 
hujusmodi.” 
44 De Trinitate 1, p. 14 for faith as theological virtue. On the need of Grace for any 
virtuous act, see De dominio divino 3.4-5. 
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to the sphere of revelation, arguing that the unassisted human rea-
son is capable of accurately perceiving the truth about things in this 
world without the need of divine assistance. Faith factors into this 
question when truths understood by pagans such as Aristotle must 
be explained; Aristotle lacked the Christian faith, yet reasoned out the 
truth of things in the world. This led Aquinas to conclude that one 
could not have faith and knowledge about the same thing. Faith re-
quires assent without evidence, while knowledge entails having that 
evidence.45 Henry of Ghent [d. 1293] is the last widely studied philos-
opher to have argued the need for divine illumination before Nich-
olas of Cusa in the fifteenth century. By the shape of Wyclif’s argu-
ments here, it is difficult to avoid concluding that he followed Henry, 
Bonaventure, and Grosseteste in arguing the need for divine illumi-
nation. “For it is impossible for a creature to know anything unless it 
knows it through grounding from the authority of God teaching and 
moving to assent.“46
All that we understand, then, requires some faithful assent of the 
human mind, some acquiescence to evidence that might be doubted. 
In the case of understanding objects we perceive, our intuition of 
sense data entails faith of a kind, which kindles growth of knowl-
edge as our experiences increase. Gradually the knowledge we ac-
quire becomes fodder for the aggregation of sense experiences into 
judgments we make about the world, which judgments would be 
impossible without the fundamental faith we have in the individual 
experiences. If this is a real quality, and not just a fiction we invent 
to explain our knowing, then it must be like the other aspects of our 
knowledge of things, it must be in itself something predicable of the 
human mind, an act as such that may be identifiable in every act of 
knowing.47
45 Summa theologiae 2:2.1.4. See Joseph Owens, “Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and 
Experience,” Cambridge History of Late Medieval Philosophy, ed. Anthony Kenny, 
Norman Kretzmann and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 440-59. 
46 De Trinitate 2, p. 19. “Nam impossible est creaturam quicquam cognoscere 
nisi cognoscat illud per locum ab auctoritate dei docentis et moventis ad 
assensum.” 
47 For Wyclif’s consideration of the ontological status of mental acts, see De Acti-
bus Anime pars prima, pp. 1-57, although he has little to say there about the re-
lation of faith to the reasoning process. See Dialogus 12 for a brief discussion of 
the difference between opinion and faith. 
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Faith has a natural place in all our acts of understanding, great and 
small, and if we can claim to have an accurate explanation for even 
the least act of understanding the simplest thing, we should also ad-
mit to the possibility that great truths of faith, such as the Trinity, may 
be explored and understood by human reason.48 We reason best from 
basic truths (Aristotle’s first principles) taken in faith, which is funda-
mental to all knowing. The truth that all truths are reducible to one 
fundamental truth shows that God moves the mind to assent to the 
truth before the mind itself gives its assent, which is the mark of faith 
preceding reasoned knowing. Ultimately, all arguments rest on argu-
ments from authority—but divine authority, not human. Human rea-
soning is only capable, only able to be trusted, if it, in turn, trusts God. 
The Muslims who prohibit reason from exploring the faith are fools, 
for they close themselves off from the merits available to them.49
◘   ◘   ◘
If the articles of faith were demonstrable scientifically, philoso-
phers would already have done so, without the need for revelation. 
But the articles of faith are difficult, subtle, hidden from natural light. 
The merit that comes from faith consists in voluntarily and humbly 
submitting the sensibility to the authority of the Catholic Church and 
the articles of faith, against which rebellion is a sin. So to view faith 
and reason as incompatible is premature. Faith is at once an act of be-
lieving, a habit, an assent to a truth; since what is known is believed 
as well, faith and knowing are not really incompatible. One can have 
both in the same case.50 Turning to Moderni predecessors, the dis-
agreement between Wyclif and Holcot is limited, and in fact the two 
48 Compare to Bradwardine, De causa Dei 1.1, corr. 32, where he argues against 
philosophers who believe themselves capable of demonstrating all truths with-
out need of revelation. Bradwardine argues at length of the presence of faith in 
every act of knowing, continuing on to illustrate Christian history as defined 
by the concord of faith and reason, pp. 28ff. 
49 De Trinitate 4, pp. 33-34. 
50 Here Wyclif’s argument with Holcot, if it is with him, becomes more complex. 
Both agree of the need for the believer to submit himself to the authority of the 
Church, but the reasons differ. Holcot argued as much because he believed 
that no natural logic could establish the compossibility of truths evident to em-
pirical experience and the truths of the faith. This is not to say that he believed 
there to be a need for two separate kinds of logic, but that unassisted reason 
can only reach so far in its analysis. See Kennedy, pp. 19-21. 
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agree on more than they disagree: both recognize that truths of the 
faith must be believed on authority of Scripture and the Church, both 
argue for use of formal reasoning in theological matters, and both ap-
pear to suspect that bad reasoning lies at the base of heresy more of-
ten than not. The point of divergence is on reasoning within theology; 
Holcot believes it best for responding to problems within theology, 
and less useful for adducendum, or dialectical exploration, while Wyc-
lif argues in these chapters for its centrality in just that activity.51 He 
explicitly says as much in De dominio divino 1.6.
And so the same thing is subject of theology by reason of its dignity and 
also the subject of metaphysics. But the reasons differ in three ways. For 
the theologian rightly considers created beings according to the exem-
plary reasons they have in the Word, and indirectly according to their ex-
istence in their proper genera. Thus theology is not perfected before the 
theologian arrives in paradise. Secondly, the theologian adheres by faith 
and authority of Scripture to any of the conclusions of his science; indeed, 
he should explicitly understand this insofar as he is a theologian. Third, 
the theologian humbly proceeds to the proper highest subject, and under-
stands it as such, but confusedly; barely understanding as distinct knowl-
edge that which he will distinctly know in paradise. And therefore the or-
der of theology will not be reversed in paradise, but will devour every 
other science, and laying aside perverse ways of proceeding; metaphys-
ics does the contrary. And it is clear that in the Word is sufficient connec-
tion to truth, and if the creature knows nothing save the Lord Jesus Christ 
and that which according to His essence or being is intelligible in the Son, 
then they [i.e. knower and known] are connected.52
51 Wyclif has much more to say about faith in other works, but in these it is con-
sidered as the virtue requisite for understanding, without argument as to 
how it is related to the act of understanding. See, for instance, De triplici vin-
culo amoris 5, in Polemical Works in Latin, 2 vols. ed. Rudolf Buddensieg (Lon-
don, 1883), 1: 176-9. Cf. Trialogus 3.2, pp. 133-4: “These three theological vir-
tues, faith, hope and love, differ in this, that faith bespeaks supernatural and 
habitual understanding of the believing, between considering and knowing, 
and faith has praiseworthy characteristics. But understand that faith is some-
times accepted for the act of believing, sometimes for the habit [of faith] and 
sometimes for the truth in which is believed. Thus the faithful say that first is 
the faith as [qua] we believe, second is the faith through which [per quam] we be-
lieve, and third is the faith which [quam] we believe. And some faith (as the 
schoolmen say) is unformed, when ‘the demons believe and tremble’ [James 
2.19], while other times faith is formed of charity. It seems to me, though, that 
the faithful, according to the integrity of [their] faith, necessarily have charity, 
while demons and anyone lacking it [charity] are accordingly infidels.” 
52 De dominio divino 1.7 ed. R. L. Poole (London, 1890), p. 43/3-21: “Et sic idem est 
subiectum adequacionis theologie quod et subiectum dignitatis, et idem subi-
ectum theologie et methaphisce. Sed raciones diversificantur in tribus. Nam 
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2.3. Analogy and God Talk
Later in the treatise, Wyclif makes a related case for the more spe-
cific issue of reason delineating the distinction of persons within the di-
vine essence, leading to his argument for the necessity of care with how 
language is used in theology. The best way to begin study of doctri-
nal truth is to look to the different ways terms signify as they are used 
in theology. To do this, one must first give credal assent to the doctrine 
one seeks to analyze. The Modalist heresy arose, Wyclif argues, when 
one presumed to understand the Trinity by analyzing the terms to be 
used before assenting in belief. “And among all the heresies concerning 
the divine Trinity, I believe that today things are more perilous because 
the community of the Moderni deny universal truths.”53
Running throughout Wyclif’s argument are references to the util-
ity of analogical predication, the philosophical reference theory 
most commonly associated with Aquinas. Thomas had argued that 
the best way of understanding how our language might refer to the 
transcendent Godhead is through understanding that an ontolog-
ical difference separates God from creation analogous to the differ-
ence between substance and accident.54 Since Thomas’s own under-
theologus recte considerat de creatis secundum raciones exemplares quas ha-
bet in Verbo, et indirecte secundum existenciam in genere proprio. Ideo non 
perficietur theologia antequam devntum sit ad patriam. Secondo theologus 
adheret fide et auctoritate Scripture cuicumque conclusioni sue sciencie; ymo, 
hoc debet explicite, in quantum theologus, cognoscere. Tercio theologus humi-
liter procedit a proprio subiecto maxime, primo, et per se cognito, sed confuse; 
minime autem cognito quoad distinctam noticiam quosque ipsum fuerit dis-
tincte cognitum in patria. Et ideo ordo theologice non erit reversus in patria, 
sed devorabit omnes alias sciencias, et deponet preposterum ordinem proce-
dendi; econtra autem de methaphisica. Et patet uod in verbo est sufficiens con-
nexio veritatum, etsi creatura nichil sciat nisi dominum Iesum Christum et ea 
que secundum essenciam vel esse intelligible in Filio connectuntur.” 
53 De Trinitate 9, p. 100: “[E]t inter omnes hereses concernentes trinitatem, credo 
quod hec esset hodie periculosior quia communitas modernorum negancium 
veritates et universalia nec non eciam verificancium dicta auctorum solum de 
signis attribuunt …“ 
54 The literature on this subject is vast, running from historical studies of the devel-
opment of the idea in Thomas’s own thought, to the theory’s comprehensibility 
and utility in light of contemporary philosophy of language. For Thomas’s ear-
lier thought, see In Sent. I, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, c and ad. l; In Sent. 3, d. 2, q. l, a. 1, ad. 
3; for later development, see De Veritate q. 2, a. 11; Summa theologiae 1.1, Q. 13, a. 
5. For a representative treatment of the theory in light of contemporary interests, 
see David Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven, 1973). 
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standing of how this analogical predication functions developed as 
his own thought evolved, it is not surprising that a host of different 
approaches cropped up in scholastic theology, well before Cardinal 
Cajetan’s notoriously inaccurate interpretation in the 1490s.55 Wyc-
lif is clear that univocal and equivocal predication about God, par-
ticularly about the divine persons’ identity through their relations to 
one another, is wholly impossible.56 This is important to bear in mind, 
not only throughout De Trinitate, but in all his theological works. Sco-
tus famously argued for the univocity of being allowing for univo-
cal predication of God and creation. We will see that De Incarnatione 
Verbi is in large part a development of Scotus’s christology, and it is 
difficult to avoid comparisons to Scotus when reading De ente primo in 
communi, the second treatise of Book I of the Summa de ente57 Wyclif’s 
arguments in this treatise to delineate the right use of analogy in talk-
ing about God, while not terribly clear, should at least define the ex-
tent to which Wyclif should be identified with Scotism.
Rather than lay out a scheme by which the theologian can best use 
language for God-predication, organized along recognizable meta-
physical lines such as proportionality, Wyclif more commonly de-
scribes how our contact with God through language brings us closer 
to comprehension of the divine. “We cannot cognize God here purely 
and as a consequence since we cannot impose terms unless propor-
tionate to our knowledge, it is clear that we cannot adapt terms to God 
for pure signification.“58 Our temporal approach to God is bounded 
55 See E. J. Ashworth, “Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: 
Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992), 94–135. Following Aquinas, 
the next important thinker to explore the topic was Henry of Ghent; see Jos De-
corte, “Henry of Ghent on Analogy: Critical Reflections of Jean Paulus’ Inter-
pretation,” in Henry of Ghent, ed. W. Vanhamel (Louvain, 1996), pp. 71–105. For 
early fourteenth-century theories, see E. J. Ashworth, “Equivocation and Anal-
ogy in Fourteenth-Century Logic: Ockham, Burley, and Buridan,” in Historia 
Philosophi Medii Aevi: Studien der Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 2 vols. 
(Amsterdam, 1991), 1:23-43. In her “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Cen-
tury Background to Cajetan” [Dialogue XXXI (1992), pp. 399-413], Ashworth 
concentrates on Peter Aureol (d. 1322), Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323), and John of 
Jandun (d. 1328), Parisian thinkers influential to Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444), 
Dominic of Flander (d. 1479), and Paulus Soncinas (d. 1494), Cajetan’s prede-
cessors. A study of analogy and religious language in Oxford from Ockham 
through the 1370s would help to explain Wyclif’s approach, which is not an 
original one, but differs from Burley’s as described by Ashworth. 
56 De Trinitate, p. 99. 
57 See Johannis Wyclif Summa de ente Libri Primi Tractatus Primus et Secundus, ed. S. 
Harrison Thomson (Oxford, 1930), esp. pp. 62–70. 
58 De Trinitate, p. 115. 
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by our inability to breach God’s transcendence, but through the fruits 
of the Spirit we can rejoice in God’s love and so enjoy God. We do 
not enjoy God, but we do enjoy His attributes. The most simple terms 
connote in signifying God, His being, but they do not signify Him pri-
marily; those most likely to do so would be privative terms composed 
from the divine transcendence.59
Man’s passionate nature is analogous to God’s, and human pas-
sions are attributed to Him in figurative language. “Otherwise it is 
right for us to understand a term when its primary signification 
matches God analogously, and elsewhere when its primary signifi-
cation cannot match God but through analogous properties found in 
such signs, as regality is in the lion as invincible lord of the beasts. 
This anthonomastic analogy matches God. Thus God is called a lion 
in Scripture, and it is clear when the language is figurative and when 
not.“60 Reason, goodness, knowing, and so on are causes in God for 
their realization in creation, so that they are only truly predicable in-
sofar as they relate to God; all created perfections are proportionate 
to divine perfection by analogy. Anselm’s recognition of created be-
ing predicates in the divine being leads him to conclude that to find 
our created good we ought love the simple good of God, which is the 
good of all.
This singular goodness of God is infinitely prior in nature to anything 
universal, and so truth as much as goodness is communicated univer-
sally to the creatures of God. Who would say that the source partici-
pates in the water of the river or the lake, which could not be water 
without there already having existed water in the source?61
Since prayer is the elevation of the mind to God, it is clear that it as-
sists considerably, as it helps us to recognize that God’s glory, holi-
ness, and any other attribute we praise is inseparable from God. This 
makes expressions of glory and wonder at the greatness of God a kind 
of prayer, for it unites the mind to God’s very being. “[A]nd there can 
be nothing so fulfilled or replenishing, nor to which the human spirit 
is so susceptible, than God.“62
59 In scholastic terminology, “connotation”’ means that a term like “blindness” 
causes one to think of sight, and thus indirectly signifies it. “Blindness” is also 
a privative term, in that it refers to something absent or lacking in the subject. 
60 De Trinitate, pp. 124-25. 
61 De Trinitate, p. 127. His reference to Anselm is to Proslogion 25. Wyclif refers 
the reader to his fuller treatment of this in De universalibus, 4-5. 
62 De Trinitate, p. 117. 
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For analysis of the limitations of language in describing the Trin-
ity, we can do no better than to examine how predicating relations 
within the divine being is possible. But before we can see how the 
Moderni err in supposing the validity of the syllogism “God is Father, 
God is Son, therefore Father is Son,” we must first be clear about 
ontology. Wyclif’s realism allows him to hold that the syllogism in 
question is a paralogism of the sort: Animal is Lion; Animal is Horse, 
therefore Lion is Horse. As the Universal is one common to many 
singulars, we do not reason from one relation of Universal to singu-
lar and another such relation to conclude about the necessity of the 
relation of the singulars. Theologians unable to distinguish the logi-
cal subtlety or engage in precise reasoning will not be able to defend 
the faith in such arguments. Even worse is the theologian who says 
that such reasoning should hold in every matter other than those of 
faith. Those who deny natural theology give Muslim theologians free 
reign to claim their faith to be on a par with our own! “When the Sar-
acen would claim Mohammed as excellent a prophet as our Christ, 
then unless a defense against their evidence beyond what the Sara-
cens have in their law, we could in no way prevail against the adver-
saries of our own law.“63
2.4. Trinity as Universal
Realism in Universals makes explaining one being with three per-
sons much easier. Assuming that the differing natures demand a real 
difference in an “indivisible being” is the root of Avicenna’s mistake 
that the Trinity entails a divine multiplicity. God is not one person, 
but one substance, which can be many in one if a Universal is real, for 
it is as many places as there are particulars. The particulars themselves 
are not multiple because they are particularized. “An example of this 
is in created nature, for according to the way of speaking in Scripture, 
the nature of the Universal is multiple and numerous according to the 
multitude of its singulars. The human species is founded in three per-
sons, Adam, Eve, and Cain, and it is in three because each of them is a 
63 De Trinitate, p. 133. “Cum Saraceni dicerent Mahometum tam excellentem 
prophetam sicut fuit Christus noster, ideo nisi assit defensorium contra evi-
dencias ultra hoc quod habent Saraceni in lege sua, in nullo prevalebimus con-
tra adversarium legis nostre.” 
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human being, yet none of those three people are threefold themselves 
because they are in this species [divided up three ways]. And the spe-
cies is in each of them as a species. A species is in a certain thing as it 
is in a supposit, but the certain thing is itself in the species as existing 
in its common cause.“64
The divine being is not a universal because universals have many 
singular instantiates, and the divine nature is unified. Later, in chap-
ter 13, he will argue that the divine nature is a universal of which 
there are three instantiations, G(f), G(s), and G(hs). He is not contra-
dicting himself; here he means to say that the divine being is not a 
universal in the sense that the persons are instantiations—as created 
beings are instantiations of their universals—because with created 
being, the individual instantiations are distinct from one another and 
the universal in itself, but with the divine persons, there is no sepa-
rating distinction between one another, or between a person and the 
divine nature. The distinction appears to be formal, as Scotus and 
Ockham had earlier said.
Alessandro Conti has shown elsewhere in this volume that Wyclif’s 
conception of the formal distinction changed, and we should pause to 
see just which type of formal distinction he has in mind. In Purgans er-
rores circa universalia in communi he describes the difference between 
divine persons as really distinct, relegating much less to the formal 
distinction. In De universalibus, the persons are distinct, but the dis-
tinction is more complex. Here, the persons are “really but not essen-
tially” distinct as three things, each of the same spirit, but the persons 
are each formally distinct from the nature.” This appears to be the ar-
rangement he presents in De Trinitate 13, although he does not refer to 
his “real-but-not-essentially” distinction.66 Ivan Mueller argues for a 
much later date for De universalibus (1373) than Thomson gives (1368-
64 De Trinitate, pp. 79-80 “Exemplum huius est in natura creata, nam secundum 
modum loquendi scripture, natura universalis multipliciter numerose secun-
dum multitudinem suorum singularium ut species humana fundata in tribus 
personis, sicut Adam, Eva, et Cayn, est in tribus quia quilibet horum trium ho-
minum, et tamen nullus illorum est triplex quamvis sit in illa specie, et illa 
species sicut species est in illo. Species quidem est in illo tamquam in suo sup-
posito sed ipsum est in specie tamquam in suo communi causante.” 
65 See Conti, above. Also Purgans errores … in De Ente, ed. M. H. Dziewicki, p. 38.25, 
and De universalibus, ed. Ivan Mueller (Oxford, 1985), pp. 91/135–92/156. 
66 See De Trinitate 3, pp. 140-142. 
Step h en e. Lah ey i n A Com p A ni on to Joh n Wy C l i f (2006)152
69).67 Perhaps if De Trinitate (Mueller suggests 1368, Thomson 1370) 
was written after Purgans errores circa universalia (Mueller and Thom-
son agree that this predates 1368) but before De universalibus, then De 
Trinitate would be a good place to look for evidence of the complica-
tion of Wyclif’s view of distinctions.
Properties do not constitute the person, substance does. Properties 
serve only as a medium for us by which one person is recognizably 
distinguishable from another. In the divine being, persons are dis-
tinct not according to their properties, but by relation, and speaking 
of relations within the divine being is difficult. Augustine argues that 
predicating of relation in God is a middle way between predication 
according to substance and predication according to accident.68 Au-
gustine’s intent, Wyclif suggests, was to make a formal distinction in 
eternal being between the subject and that which is not its accident. 
In God, there is a person, and then that person is G(f), G(s), or G(hs), 
“because to be a person is to be an hypostasis or substance, and this 
is said to be in itself and not in regards to some other thing, but to be 
Father or to be word is relative and is said as regards another, as is 
clear throughout De Trinitate Bk. VII.”69 Each divine person is based 
in common divine material, and to speak as if the Son is prior to the 
Father through truth but not causation is just sloppiness and ontolog-
ically misleading.
We do not posit a bare divine person devoid of personal nature 
simply because we recognize the hypostatic nature of the person as 
a possible basis for accidents. The divine nature causes the persons 
just as Universals cause singulars, but according to the logic of the 
Church it does not come into being, so a different sense of causing 
is involved. We cannot deny that the Son is produced from the sub-
stance of the Father, but “produced” [produceretur] must be under-
stood properly. “Produces” and “proceeds” [fit] must be meant dif-
ferently, and Wyclif suggests two ways of understanding these verbs. 
67 See De universalibus, introduction, pp. xix-xxxviii. 
68 See Augustine, De Trinitate 5.1.3-8. 
69 De Trinitate, p. 81. “Secundo patet, ut mihi videtur, quod prius est esse perso-
nam quam esse patrem vel filium vel spiritum sanctum, quia esse personam 
est esse hypostasim vel substanciam, et dici ad se et non ad aliud; sed esse pa-
trem aut esse verbum est relativum et dicitur ad aliud, ut patet VII De Trini-
tate, diffuse.” The reference is to order of knowing, not order of being; Wyclif, 
following Augustine and the Western tradition, recognizes that by the order of 
being, nature precedes person. 
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Here Wyclif appears to be reasoning about the divine persons’ oper-
ations using linguistic structure. If predication in being corresponds 
to predication in words, then it stands to reason that, Latin being the 
language expressing these truths, there must be ontological declen-
sions.70 He suggests four ways of ablative predication within God. In 
the first, [x does m by/through y] G(f) knows by G(s) and loves by G(hs), 
while G(s) lives, knows, and wills by G(f), and G(hs) lives, knows, and 
wills through G(f) and G(s). In the second, the ablative predication is 
of formal cause [x is Q through Q-ness as regards x], and in every such 
formal predication here Wyclif means for us to think of Q as Divine 
Nature and x as a person. In the third mode of ablative predication 
within God, a person acts through the nature of the action: the Father 
“speaks” the Son through “wording” or self-expression. This differs 
from the first in that the relation is between the agent and the nature 
of the act, rather than between two agents, which the first describes. 
In the fourth way of ablative predication, x is Q because to be Q is 
an accident associated with x’s substance. Confusion arises regarding 
the relation of persons within the divine nature for those unfamiliar 
with the difference between “is” in these predicative senses, and “is” 
in identity statements.
More simply, Anselm expresses the triune nature of God in mak-
ing an analogy to a river, which has three distinct elements: a source, 
a flow, and the delta. Augustine and Anselm give examples that are 
useful means of understand the ordering of persons. In our under-
standing of the relation of the uncreated Trinity to every created na-
ture—whether Universal or singular—there is a base similarity, in 
that each being is One, True, and Good. For example, the cross is an 
emblematic symbol of love: the crosspiece demonstrates the width 
of divine love, the vertical piece the final perseverance from earth to 
heaven, and the headpiece the celestial hope because Christ is head 
of the Church.71 Simply because such created trinities are difficult to 
recognize in nature, it is not right for philosophers to reject such at-
tempts. If the human mind has the right expression of what is known 
in the mental word, and the love arising from knowing the truth is 
right, then is recreated in our minds the uncreated Trinity.
70 This seems to be the substance of De Trinitate, pp. 84-86. 
71 De Trinitate 8, pp. 91–92. 
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2.5. The Father is to the Son as Speaker is to Word
In the treatise’s fifth chapter, Wyclif suggests that understand-
ing the distinction of the persons in the Trinity is best begun by rec-
ognizing that the Word expressed by God signifies perfectly the 
truth of the divine essence. This is the analogy John 1:1 illustrates 
to show the distinction of God the Father, [G(f)] the speaker, and 
God the Son [G(s)] the Word. (i.e. Father : Son : : Speaker : Word). 
Logical discourse communicates truth apart from particular things, 
for when demonstrating a syllogism one speaks of donkeys and 
men, but does not mean for the hearer to think that the subject of 
the statements are animals. So speech is carried not in words, but in 
what it signifies. Truth is predicated more in the being of things, not 
words. Accidents “speak” their subject as species do their genus. In 
man, white is said from whiteness, and whiteness is said from the 
white man; likewise, if Paul is said to be man essentially from hu-
manity, then humanity “speaks” Paul to be a man. Grosseteste ex-
presses this, “all the world is a statement speaking the art, word and 
intention intrinsic to God from which it flows.”72 The inherence re-
lation of accident to subject automatically entails self-expression of 
the particular in which the relation is founded. The argument can 
best be described:
a. A sentence expresses a truth when it is true, which truth is a state-
ment identical to its ontological subject matter. 
b. A statement “Fx” is True if Fx is a part of creation. 
c. All creation is a collection of predications related as the form “Fx” 
suggests. 
d. That collection itself is a predication expressive of the Word. 
e. Each statement, whether the set (creation), a subset (a branch, or 
twig of the Porphyrian tree) or an individual (Peter) is analogous 
“in a certain way” to a correlate truth in the divine mind. 
f. The set of all correlate truths in the divine mind, possible, actual, 
necessary, past, present and future, are the Word, which has a 
causal agency on all created statements. 
g. The identity of the Word with God is undeniable Therefore: G(f) : 
G(s) : : Speaker : word 
72 Grosseteste, Hexameron 1.1, first version 2-3, p. 48, in Robert Grosseteste, On the 
Six Days of Creation, trans. C. F. J. Martin (Oxford, 1999), p. 48. 
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If all creation speaks itself, each substance must contain an essen-
tial word, and God ordains the limitation of the degree of being that 
each substance has to its self-expression in just this way. Each sub-
stance expresses itself in measure, form, and weight, which expres-
sion is analogous to the uncreated Trinity governing it.73 Objections 
to this would hold that insensible bodies cannot have appetites or 
cannot express themselves as do created minds. But earth does have 
an appetite to move in a straight line, light refracts according to set 
laws, and these basic physical laws indicate a superior force guiding 
these bodies, using them to express a regulation greater than the in-
dividual bodies. All physical laws, including the laws of motion and 
physics, have as their basis divine laws enacted and expressing fun-
damental truths, which illustrates the need for theology to lie at the 
heart of the physical sciences, as well as of metaphysics. Thus, fol-
lowing a lengthy discussion of how laws of mechanics articulate cre-
ated being’s self expression, Wyclif comes to two conclusions. First, 
every essential nature desires itself and expresses itself according to 
its own good. Second, every created nature expresses itself in its ac-
cidents and in its Universal as species and genus, and in its essence 
intrinsically in the form that gives it definition. Each case of self-ex-
pression entails use of a word, and this tie of a created being to its 
word itself “speaks” the primordial tie of Divine being to Word. 
From this primordial tie simultaneously arises the resolution con-
sequent to an expression of truth, a delight, that completes the un-
created Trinity. This, Grosseteste argues in Hexameron 14, is best at 
explicating the nature of the Trinity for our minds. Philosophers rec-
ognize that the same essence is at once possible intellect, agent intel-
lect, and will, which relation of distinction within one thing is anal-
ogous, as Augustine holds, and as grammarians and logicians have 
long recognized.74 Other scientists, including rhetoricians, arithmeti-
cians, geometricians, astronomers, and so on, all recognize echoes of 
the Trinity in the created order. 
The Moderni, by whom Wyclif most likely means Wodeham, Hol-
cot, and their followers, disregard this truth by denying the truth of 
universals in things, departing from “the ancients” and causing them 
to misunderstand distinctions within the divine being. The Johannine 
73 Grosseteste, Hexameron 8.4.4-6, pp. 226–27. 
74 De Trinitate 6, p. 61. 
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phrase “the word was with God” must be understood as positing a 
distinction between God the speaker and God the word, and John’s 
silence regarding the Holy Spirit here should not be taken as indic-
ative of ignorance of Its identity with G(f) and G(s), see I John 5:8.75 
The Holy Spirit is, in fact, the means by which we understand God, as 
the Gospels affirm repeatedly. To imagine that we see other gods than 
the Triune God is indeed the grievous sin against the Holy Spirit de-
scribed in Mark 3:29. Wyclif describes the uncreated Trinity as mani-
fested first in the being of G(s), the second person.
I believe that John, naming the Son of God ‘word’, was intending the 
entire sentence philosophically said about the utterance of the real-
ity, and was intending deep subtlety and through the threefold gen-
eration of the word, [was showing] the word [itself] to be threefold: 
first, the mind concealed and consubstantial with God in the speaking 
which can be known through the first phrase, ‘in the beginning was 
the word.’ The second word is accidental within the speaking as elic-
ited knowledge which can be known through the second phrase, ‘the 
word was with God.’ The third is the word spoken from outside, as by 
the voice or through a work, and this can be known through the third 
phrase, in which ‘the word was made flesh.’ These three manners of 
words are grouped together in Him, and there is no speciousness with 
this truth, which is the highest spirit expressing itself to be truth, of 
past or future, either by negation or logical possibility or any other hy-
pothetical truth.76
75 This is the famous trinitarian passage proven by Erasmus to be a later addi-
tion to the letter. The text of 1 John 5:7–8 in the Latin Vulgate read “There are 
three on earth that bear witness, the Spirit, the water and the blood, and these 
three are one. There are three that bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word and 
the Holy Spirit, and these three are One.” The latter, italicized sentence Erasmus 
expunged as not original to the Greek. Breck refers to this passage as 1 John 7 
without further reference. 
76 De Trinitate, p. 74: “Hoc tamen credo quod beatus Johannes nominans filium 
dei ‘verbum’ intendebat totam sentenciam philosophiam predicatam de dicen-
cia rei et longe subtiliorem intendebat et per triplicem generacionem verbi, tri-
plex esse verbum: primum mentis magis abditum quod est consubstanciale 
ipsi dicenti quod notari potest per primam proposicionem, in principio erat 
verbum. Secundum verbum est accidentale intus dictum ut noticia elicita quod 
notari potest per secundam proposicionem verbum erat apud deum. Tercium 
est verbum adextra dictum ut vox vel opus et hoc notari potest per terciam 
proposcionem in hoc enim quod verbum caro factum est. Congregantur enim 
in eo omnes iste tres maneries verborum, nec est color apud istam veritatem, 
que est summum spiritum dicere se esse veritatem, de preterito vel de futuro 
aut negacionem vel posse logicum vel aliam veritatem hypoteticam.” 
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2.6. Referring to a (Formally Distinct) Divine Person
At this point, we must concentrate our attention on how the divine 
persons are related to one another, and how these relations are de-
scribed. If God the Father [G(f)] generates God the Son [G(s)], mean-
ing that God generates God, God would have to be distinct from God 
insofar as Son and Father differ. Otherwise, insofar as G(f) is not the 
same as G(s), then God is not God. Three results follow. First, God 
differs from God. Second, God is distinct from God but not different 
because that would entail real distinction in material essence. Third, 
God is neither different nor distinct from God. 
Regarding the first, holding “God is different from God” would be 
to say that God is not the same as [God (f), God (s), God (hs)], and the 
Trinity is other than God. Or if God (f) is not the same as God (s), then 
God the Trinity differs from God (a Person). If God is not the same as 
God, then the difference either lies in number within God, or some-
how outside of God, with a distinct God. The former, that there is a 
difference in number within God, cannot be held, but the latter leads 
to a difference between God as God and God (a Person). The problem 
rests in how we use the term “God.” If the analogy were to a man, in 
that “Fred” refers to Fred the material body and also to Fred’s soul, 
then God differing from God could work because in man body differs 
from soul in the same man. But “God” cannot refer to God as such and 
God (a Person) in this way, because there is one and only one God; 
nothing can demonstrate real difference within Him, otherwise my 
God [God (Father)] might have something (generation) that your God 
[God (Son)] lacks. So, Wyclif argues, this first suggestion cannot be the 
way to describe the relation of God to the Trinity of persons in God. 
Denying the second (God is distinct from God but not different) 
entails looking at how to use the personal distinction. John Dama-
scene holds that the three persons differ in number, not nature, while 
Augustine holds God (the Son) differs from God (the Father) by cau-
sality. Who can understand what supports theological truth when the 
authorities obviously use reference schemes that vary according to 
their needs? “If a friend is said to be ‘another me,’ how much more is 
the Son who is the same essence by number with the Father said to be 
another self!”77 What of the case of where A thinks of God (Father), B 
77 De Trinitate, p. 137: “Si enim amicus figurative dicitur ‘alter ego’, quanto magis 
filius qui est eadem essencia numero cum patre dicitur alter ipse!” A rare Cice-
ronian reference in Wyclif. 
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thinks of God (Son), and C of God (Holy Spirit)? Are what each un-
derstands different in themselves? Augustine argues that when one 
person of the Trinity is named, the other two are contained in the es-
sence of the subject of the predication, even if the “personal” suppo-
sition suggests otherwise.78 Scriptural examples abound, Wyclif con-
tinues, in which the need to recognize that [God (f), God (s), God (hs)] 
is meant when predicating of God (a Person). The term “person” is 
not proportionate to “incommunicable thing.” We must not risk con-
fusing predication of person with predication of essence, Wyclif says, 
and the means of avoiding the confusion lies in recognizing the need 
for the formal distinction. 
The Divine essence is not caused, communicable, and neither be-
gotten nor begetting. A Divine person is caused, not communicable, 
and either begotten or begetting. There must be some means of distin-
guishing between essence and person, and Wyclif follows Scotus and 
Ockham in invoking the formal distinction to distinguish between 
them—not that the person is not the essence (or the essence the per-
son) but that the person is not formally convertible with the essence. 
G(f) is distinct from divine essence in that G(f) is not communicable, 
while the divine essence is communicable.79 “I know that the univer-
sal is prior by nature to its singular such that any singular whatso-
ever is bound by it. But it is not thus of the divine nature with regard 
to its supposit (i.e. [G(f), G(s), G(hs)]); but of personal causation there 
is disagreement, as some concede that the Father precedes the Son in 
principle but does not cause Him. I think the Father properly causes 
the Son and both together cause the Holy Spirit, and all three are the 
first cause of all things.”80 
Augustine agrees, holding that God is the cause of all, including 
His wisdom; both are the cause of all else sempiternally. Chrysostom 
holds that G(f) is prior to G(s) not by nature but by cause, and this is 
78 Augustine, De Trinitate, 1, p. 2. 
79 Wyclif’s use of the formal distinction is by no means uncommon; Adam Wode-
ham’s position is far more fully developed, perhaps because of his more aus-
tere ontology. See Hester Goodenough Gelber, Logic and Trinity: A Clash of Val-
ues in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335 (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1974), 
pp. 234–64. 
80 De Trinitate, p. 143. Compare to De ente primo in communi 4, pp. 92-94. Thomson 
summarizes Wyclif’s argument here as denying a formal distinction between 
persons, (see p. xxxii), but I think this is inaccurate. 
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confirmed by Grosseteste, who argues in De libero arbitrio that there 
is no procession in the Godhead, and no causation save that of cre-
ation. Grosseteste reports Hilarion as saying that the Father is greater 
than the Son not through the Son being Incarnated but through Fili-
ation, but to hold that the Son is thus less than the Father is wrong. 
Grosseteste strives to find agreement between Augustine, Chrysos-
tom, and Hilarion; we ought to emulate him! “Would that the Mod-
erni writing now would attend to the words and sense of this good 
man, whose intention was to agree with the ancient teachers by col-
lecting their catholic senses and expositing them in pious and favor-
able sense—and not by arguing against dead men in equivocation to 
equal them in their writing and so be exalted. Very many are guilty of 
this today.”81 
2.7. Generation Within God: Wyclif’s Commentary on I Sent. D.5
The fullest theological analysis of the treatise lies in Wyclif’s ex-
ploration of the question “how can God generate in one person and 
be generated in another person without compromise in the absolute 
unity of the divine essence?”. This takes its root in Lombard’s fifth 
distinction of the first book of the Sententiae, but the discussion is as 
much about how language functions in explicating the subtle onto-
logical relations within the divine essence as it is about the relations 
themselves.82 Further complicating matters, Wyclif occasionally looks 
ahead to addressing the metaphysics of Incarnation in this discussion, 
and refers back again to this discussion in De Incarnacione, prompt-
ing us to pay close attention to his explanation of how theological 
language depicts divine reality.83 Careful analysis of Wyclif’s argu-
ment on the subject would involve exploring the Trinitarian position 
of Adam Wodeham; Hester Gelber’s study of Wodeham and Holcot’s 
81 De Trinitate, p. 145: “Utinam moderni scribentes attenderent ad verba et sen-
sus huius boni hominis, cuius intencio fuit concordare antiquos doctores col-
ligendo sensus eorum catholicos et exponendo eos ad sensum pium ac fa-
voabilem. Non enim arguendo contra homines mortuos ad sensus equivocos 
ut scripture eorum subpeditentur et scripture sic arguencium exaltentur. Sic 
enim faciun hodie culpabiliter nimis multi.” 
82 In Lombard the question is Hic quaeritur an Pater genuit divinam essentiam vel 
ipsa Filium, an essentia genuit essentiam vel ipsa nec genuit nec genita est. Peter 
Lombard, Sententiae 1, dist. 5, c. 1, (Grottaferrata, 1971), p. 80. 
83 See De Incarnacione 9, pp. 150–1. 
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thought lays the foundation for what would be a very welcome com-
parison between the two great lights of early fourteenth-century Ox-
ford and Wyclif.84
One problem that has arisen historically in understanding how the 
persons are distinct from one another yet identical in the divine es-
sence has been counting the number of entities involved. Are there 
three, or four, or more? That is, by “God” do we mean the set [G(f), 
G(s), G(hs)] or the set {divine essence + [G(f), G(s), G(hs)]} ? “There 
are three divine persons, as there are three things, anyone of which is 
God. A person is singular when it cannot be communicated to many 
supposits. The essence is not four things but any of these three … The 
Trinity is not a single of these but all three of these at once. “85 This 
Wyclif has discussed in Purgans errores circa universalia in commune.
In predication according to essence the singular and its universal are 
distinct across the board, since the singular is one, as the universal an-
other individual. It does not follow, ‘these are distinct things, so to these 
we assign number’ because through most general and most singular 
demonstrating of its supposit, any things distinct are these, yet they are 
not held numerable, since one of them remains. Thus they are distinct 
formally, but not formally distinct things. Nor are they formally ‘these 
two’ [indicating this universal and this singular] but they are this, and 
so the differences are to this sense, that these differ, but not through 
numerical difference are they formally thus; because only by difference 
formally or according to reason are they ‘these’.86
84 Hester Gelber, 1974, esp. pp. 235-317. 
85 De Trinitate, p. 149: “Sicut ergo tantum sunt tres persona divine, sic tantum 
sunt tres res quarum quelibet est deus. Persona enim est singularium possibile 
cum non potest communicari multis suppositis. Essencia igitur non est quarta 
res sed quelibet harum trium … Trinitas vero est non singula harum trium sed 
omnes tres simul.” 
86 Purgans mores circa universalia in communis, De ente I Tractatus IV, 5, p. 47/7–
22: “Conceditur eciam in predicacione secundum essenciam quod singulare et 
suum universale sunt quotlibet distincta, cum singulare sit unum, ut univer-
sale quotlibet alia individua. Non ergo sequitur: ista sunt res distincte, vel res 
distincta sunt ista, ergo ista ponunt in numerum, quia demonstrato genera-
lissimo et singularissimo eius supposito, quotlibet res distinct sunt ista, et ta-
men non ponunt in numerum, cum unum eorum sit reliquum. Et ita ista sunt 
distincta formaliter, sed non formaliter res distincte. Nec ista sunt formaliter 
‘ista duo’ (demonstrando singulare et suum universale) set sunt ‘istud’: et sic 
differencia sunt ista ad istum sensum, quod ista differunt, et tamen nulla nu-
meraliter differencia sunt formaliter ista: quia solum differencia formaliter vel 
secuncum racionem sunt ista.” 
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If you take Peter and God, you have two; since God is three in one, 
you also have four. If you count natures, you have two in Peter (body 
and spirit) and one (Deity), thus three. It follows, then, that 3 and 4 
make 2! Obviously, number breaks down as an effective tool of quan-
tification in understanding the divine nature.
A century and a half earlier, Joachim of Fiore wrote a (now lost) 
treatise criticizing Peter Lombard’s innovative analysis of how terms 
refer to the persons within the Trinity. The Calabrian claimed that 
Lombard’s description of a Trinity that neither begets nor is begotten 
entailed a fourth entity in addition to the three divine persons. Lom-
bard had emphasized the impossibility of attributing particular ac-
tions of the divine persons to the divine essence, and caused Joachim 
consternation by having used the term “essence” to mean something 
other than “person” or “hypostasis.” Joachim himself was rebuked by 
the Fourth Lateran Council for conceiving of the divine unity as a col-
lective, or group of individual persons, guilty of an inability to appre-
ciate Lombard’s nuance in reference.87 He erred, Wyclif explains, by 
confusing the reference of terms predicated of the divine essence, and 
terms predicated of persons.
Unlike any other essence-bearing thing, the Divine essence gener-
ates Itself; Lombard holds that there is a sense in which essence be-
gets essence as Father begets Son, and another sense in which essence 
is begotten by essence, as Son is begotten by Father. Some problems 
arise from this. First, if there is a sense in which G(f) begets the di-
vine essence, and the divine essence includes the being of G(f), then 
the subset is causally prior to the set. Second, if G(f) understands the 
begetting, then if G(s) is divine understanding, it must follow that 
understanding precedes understanding. Third, if there is a sense in 
which the divine essence neither begets nor is begotten, then in that 
sense there are four beings referred to by God: The begetting Father, 
the begotten Son, the spirated Holy Spirit, and the un-begotten non-
begetter, a “Quaternity.” The Church, Wyclif declares, was right to 
condemn this line of reasoning about the Lombard.
87 Joachim’s De Unitate seu Essentia Trinitatis has not been found, and given Wyc-
lif’s apparently loose formulation of Joachim’s errors, it appears not to have 
been available to him at Oxford. Joachim’s problem lies in his reading of Sen-
tentiae I, D. 25, c. 2. See Giles Emery, Trinity in Aquinas (Ypsilanti, 2003), pp. 
12–13. 
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Any determination of the Church, and especially in matters of faith, is 
as much to be believed as is the gospel. Something should not be be-
lieved to be the saying of Christ or scripturally revealed from the mean-
ing of the Holy Spirit unless brought to bear from information or faith 
by the Church. So it is right naturally and more to trust the Church as 
authority, and placed in that state by biblical canon, to be a bold del-
egate in whatever way by authority of Scripture, as would a sentence 
spoken by the Savior in any of the gospels boldly pronounce that this 
sentence would be true because they are the words of Christ.88
Wyclif’s problem lies not with Joachim, though; his argument is with 
those who allow linguistic subtlety to derail theological accuracy, al-
though as elsewhere, he names no names in this chapter. The philo-
sophical problem rests in the relation between the divine essence and 
the generating occurring within the essence. The absolute nature of 
the divine essence precludes generating or being generated, so the 
presence of this generating holding between Father and Son cannot 
be essential to God. Yet to hold that the essence is something beyond 
the generating and the being generated of the persons seems to lead 
to positing a Quaternity, a fourth divine being beyond the generating, 
the generated, and the spirated persons.
At this point it is easy to get lost in the dense thicket of arguments 
and distinctions around which Wyclif frames his analysis of the prob-
lem. Rather than recount each dispute apparent in the chapter, it will 
be more useful to frame the discussion in terms of a logical phenome-
non Desmond P. Henry has recently described.89 Henry suggests that 
a useful means of understanding how Wyclif departs from standard 
medieval thought is through analysis of his mereology, or his under-
standing of how aggregate or collective terms stand for aggregate 
88 De Trinitate, pp. 159–60: “[C]uilibet determinacioni ecclesie et specialiter ein 
materia fidei est tante credendum sicut evangelio. Patet ex hoc quod non crede-
retur aliquid esse dictum Christi vel scripture sacre ex sentencia spiritus sancti 
revelatum nisi ex informacione et fide adhibita ecclesie, ergo prius naturaliter 
et plus oportet credere ecclesie quam auctoritati et de canone Biblie tamquam 
loco ab auctoritate ut allegata protervo quacumque auctoritate ut sentencia 
Salvatoris in quocumque evangelio protervius diceret quod illa sentencia esset 
vera si esset dictum Christi.” This early estimation of the Church’s role in reg-
ulating dogma at Lateran IV differs markedly from Wyclif’s later opinion. See 
De Apostasia 5, p. 69.19-26, wherein he suggests that Joachim had detected de-
fects in the Church and was condemned for largely personal reasons. 
89 D. P. Henry, “Wyclif’s Deviant Mereology,” Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahr-
hundert,  ed. Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam. 1988), pp. 1–17. 
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beings. It is normal for us to say something like “The Union is pre-
served!” without presuming there to be something above and apart 
from the collection of things we call the Union. Wyclif’s approach, on 
the other hand, was to reason that there is an aggregate with iden-
tifiable ontological reality that arises from any set of two substan-
tial beings. What follows from this is that for any set of three people 
(Peter, Paul, and Linus), there are four aggregate beings: the three or-
dered pairs derived from the set, and the universal Humanity defin-
ing each particularized humanity of each member. There cannot be 
more than this, he argues, for each aggregate being can only arise 
from substantially real beings.90 Wyclif devotes considerable effort to 
refuting the predictable Third Man arguments arising from his posi-
tion throughout De universalibus, and uses the reality of aggregate be-
ings in his descriptions of how “a certain man” in the parable of the 
Good Samaritan serves as an aggregate for all saved people, among 
other things. Still, Henry remains puzzled as to why Wyclif would 
have made such an ontological claim, suggesting that the grounds 
for such a baroque ontology have yet to be identified. His point is 
well taken; earlier in De universalibus Wyclif objects to Burley’s con-
tention that universals are things apart from their particulars, which 
would put Wyclif in the majority who believed universals to be real, 
but not really distinct from their particulars.91 Why, then, would he 
attribute reality to aggregate beings derivable from any set of two 
particular objects?
It is possible that evidence for an answer to this question lies in De 
universalibus 11, where he presents a streamlined description of the 
argument of De Trinitate 16. Here he says that Joachim’s ignorance 
of the way Universals function led him to conclude that the set [G(f), 
G(s), G(hs)] is not a true unity, but a collective unity of resemblance, 
in the way in which many men are a single population.92 Had he rec-
ognized that the Trinity, “that common thing” is what each divine 
person is, that Itself It neither begets nor is begotten, but contains per-
sons that beget and are begotten and spirated, just as a Universal like 
90 See De universalibus 9. For a brief, accessible discussion, see Trialogus 2.l. 
91 Ibid., 4, p. 28/50. For Burley’s view, which appears closer to Wyclif’s than 
Wyclif might admit, see Elizabeth Karger, “Walter Burley’s Realism,” Vivar-
ium 37 (1999), 24-40. 
92 Ibid., 11, p. 119/611-17. 
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Humanity neither is seated nor is not seated, but contains individuals 
who are one or the other but not both, his objections would have van-
ished.93 There is a sense, Wyclif continues, in which one can say that 
God begets, or God is begotten, if one refers with the term “God” to 
G(f) or G(s) through personal supposition. “But you must not believe 
that because of the acceptance of these terms, the divine nature be-
gets or does not beget the Son.”94 The more appropriate way of un-
derstanding the term “God” is as referring to that which neither be-
gets nor is begotten; he refers the reader to Avicenna’s “equinitas non 
est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum” to encourage our understanding that 
such universal terms as “Man,” “Animal,” and “God” refer first and 
foremost to the universals prior to their instantiates.95 
As noted earlier, Wyclif is painstaking in his articulation of the 
idea that the divine essence is a universal of which the divine per-
sons are instantiates. In De universalibus he emphasizes that no other 
universal thinks or acts upon others, and while with all other uni-
versals, the particular is ontologically consequent upon the univer-
sal, with God, “the nature is not prior to nor more perfect than the 
person.”96 Further, in the related discussion in De Trinitate 16, he says 
“there is a difference between nature of the universal and the divine 
nature, because the divine nature moves every created action, but 
the nature of the universal only causes every action of its suppos-
its.”97 Aware that this same issue would figure in his treatise on the 
Incarnation, he notes that terms that refer within God to G(s) do not 
import universals from creation into the divine essence. “If it is con-
ceded that man is God in this way, it must then be conceded that hu-
manity would be deity and that humanity is eternal but deity tem-
poral according to which the Son is less than the Father, and just as 
the divine essence is common to three persons and consequently a 
Trinity, thus a man would be common to the three persons and there 
would be a confusion of persons, since [the essence] would not have 
93 This is the substance of Wyclif’s argument; the example is my own. 
94 Ibid., p. 120/648. 
95 Ibid., p. 120/655-61; reference is to Avicenna, Philosophia prima tract. 5, cap. 1, 
cited in Mueller’s edition of De universalibus p. 265. 
96 De universalibus p. 121/719. 
97 De Trinitate, 16, p. 163: “Et in hoc est differencia inter naturam universalem et 
naturam divinam, quia natura divina agit omnem accionem creature, natura 
autem universalis causat omnem accionem sui suppositi.” See also above, n. 
58. 
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been held as common, and he would be a singular in the essence of 
these persons.”98 Wyclif mentions this issue only in passing, but un-
derstanding the relation of the universal “Man” to God the Son in 
the Incarnation lies at the very heart of his treatise De Verbi Incarna-
cione, to which we now turn.
3. An Overview of Wyclif’s Christology
3.1. Historical Context
Our understanding of fourteenth-century Oxford theologians’ ar-
guments about the ontology and logic of the Incarnation is consider-
ably less than it might be. Prior to Wyclif, Ockham appears the last to 
have made a contribution to what had been a mainstay of thirteenth-
century theology. In his pared-down ontology, he rejects the existence 
of a common nature like humanity apart from individual people. But 
this easily leads to understanding him to have held that in Christ was 
an individual human person in addition to the divine nature, making 
up either a two-person person (that is, the human person Jesus, and 
with the added Word, the person of the Christ), or a Christ in which 
a human person and the divine person of the Word are not united 
by anything into a third composite. Ockham was aware that he could 
be interpreted as having advocating Nestorianism, and argued vigor-
ously against this interpretation, but the tendency amongst opponents 
of Ockham’s christology seems to have been to press the Nestorian in-
terpretation as the only comprehensible reading of his approach.99 As 
we will see, Wyclif’s approach is to argue both for the existence of a 
98 De Trinitate 16, pp. 163–64: “Ymmo si conceditur quod homo est deus ita con-
cedendum est quod humanitas esset deitas et quod humanitas est eterna sed 
deitas temporalis secundum quam filius est minor patre, et sicut essencia div-
ina est communis tribus personis et per consequens trinitas, sic homo esset 
communis illis tribus personis et esset confusio personarum cum non habere-
tur ut commune et esset singula illarum personarum essencia.” 
99 For the historical evidence of Ockham’s struggles against the label of Nesto-
rianism, see Heiko Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge Mass, 
1963), pp. 249-61. For philosophical analysis of Ockham’s christology, see Mar-
ilyn McCord Adams, “Relations, Inherence and Subsistence: or, Was Ockham 
a Nestorian in Christology?” Nous 16 (1982), 62-75. Her assessment is that Ock-
ham’s christology bows to the needs of orthodoxy, a rare instance of his privi-
leging theology over ontological consistency. 
Step h en e. Lah ey i n A Com p A ni on to Joh n Wy C l i f (2006)166
human nature apart from individual people, and for the existence of 
an aggregate man, a composite of body and soul distinct from both.
Regarding others of Wyclif’s predecessors, Nicholas Aston, no 
fan of Ockham’s ontology, appears to have read the Sentences after 
1350, and he addresses several Christological issues. His treatment of 
“Whether uncreated Truth could sustain hypostatic union with cre-
ated truth?” might well contribute significantly to understanding 
Christological controversy in Oxford during the years just prior to 
Wyclif’s.100 Another question, “Whether one person incarnated from 
another not incarnate could be a truth defended by a Catholic?,” ap-
pears only in Gaudet’s summary.101 Uthred of Boldon, the Benedictine 
whose opinions aroused an uproar as Wyclif began the Summa de ente, 
appears not to figure in this issue, as none of the censured opinions 
address the question of the Incarnation directly.102 In all likelihood, 
the richest source for Ockhamist arguments against which Wyclif 
would argue in De Incarnacione would be the works of Robert Hol-
cot (d. 1349) and Adam Wodeham (d. 1358). Unfortunately, neither of 
these theologians’ christological works have been edited. 
Holcot was famous as the eminent Dominican theologian in Ox-
ford, and his works were studied well into the sixteenth century. Hol-
cot’s theological position is not easy to delineate with terms familiar 
to the twenty-first century reader. Leonard Kennedy emphasizes his 
tendency to philosophical skepticism, suggesting that his position in-
spired with those of Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Mirecourt.103 
Others argue that equating Holcot’s unwillingness to recognize hu-
100 Robson’s description of Aston’s approach suggests less attention to ontolog-
ical questions than Wyclif shows, see Robson, pp. 106-108. For a more recent 
assessment of Aston’s place at Oxford, see Courtenay, School and Scholars, pp. 
334–5, n. 17. Most significantly, see Kaluza, “L’oeuvre Théologique de Nico-
las Aston,” where he describes Oriel 15 as containing 12 questions of Aston, of 
which the first is the question listed above. He appends the description of Eti-
enne Gaudet, an early sixteenth-century scholar of English scholasticism, of 
Aston’s works, in which the topics covered in this question are listed, see p. 
75. See also Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, p. 353, Trapp, “Augustinian The-
ology of the Fourteenth Century,” pp. 230-231. 
101 See Bender, p. 2l. 
102 D. Knowles, “The Censured Opinions of Uthred of Boldon,” Proceedings of the 
British Academy 37 (1951), 303-42. 
103 Leonard A. Kennedy’s The Philosophy of Robert Holcot, Fourteenth-century Skeptic 
(Lewiston, 1993) emphasizes Holcot’s influence on the positions of Autrecourt 
and Mirecourt, condemned in 1346 and 1347. “Since Holcot was one of the lead-
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man logic’s applicability to theological truths is less indicative of skep-
ticism than it is of his evolving understanding of the right approach to 
ordering reason in the life of faith.104 Kennedy describes Holcot’s chris-
tology very briefly, noting that he devoted only a half-page to the In-
carnation in his 248 page Sentences commentary, and appends a Quod-
libet (58) “Whether God can make an impeccable rational nature” to 
his study.105 Here Holcot says, “Although the rational creature could 
be placed in such a disposition such that he could not sin for the time 
in which he has it, yet this is not to say that he could not sin when the 
disposition is removed. And so, simply speaking, he is peccable. And 
so commonly it is said that a creature is made impeccable through 
grace, not nature.”106 Kennedy describes Holcot as having argued that, 
had Christ set aside that assumed nature, which was for Him possible, 
that it could have sinned. Indeed, there is no contradiction in holding 
that God could have united with a sinful and damned nature, in which 
case God could be both blessed and damned at once.107 
I think it likely that Kennedy’s description of Holcot’s christol-
ogy is unnecessarily abbreviated, as at least seven earlier Quodlibets 
address Incarnational theology directly.108 These include (2) Whether 
the Son of God assumed the human nature in unity of the supposit?, 
(4) Whether the history of the conception of Christ is true in totality?, 
(7) Whether Christ suitably redeemed the genus of humanity?, (8) 
Whether divinity is a part of Christ?, (9) Whether the incarnate Christ 
ing Oxonians to be read on the Continent in the 1340s, and since the doctrines of 
Nicholas and John were akin to his, it is most likely that his influence on them 
was great, even if it was reinforced by that of many other writers.” (p. 139.) 
104 Heiko Oberman, “Facientibus Quod in Se est Deus non Denegat Gratiam: Robert 
Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther’s Theology,” Harvard Theological Re-
view 55 (1962), 317-42, reprinted in his The Dawn of the Reformation (Grand Rap-
ids, 1992), pp. 84-103. See also Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason; and 
Simo Knuuttila, “Trinitarian Sophisms in Robert Holcot’s Theology,” in Sophisms 
in Medieval Logic and Grammar, ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht, 1993), pp. 348-56. 
105 Kennedy, pp. 107-109, and Appendix 4, pp. 164-67. 
106 Kennedy, p. 166: “Licet ergo creatura rationalis posset poni in tali dispositi-
one qua stante non posset peccare pro tempore pro quo eam habet, non tamen 
fit per hoc talis natura quin poterit peccare, illa dispositione ablata. Et ideo, 
simpliciter loquendo, ipsa est peccabilis. Et ideo communiter dicitur quod 
creatura potest fieri impeccabilis per gratiam, non per naturam.” 
107 Kennedy, p. 107. These he has culled from said Quodlibet, Sent 3, q. 1 a.5, and 
Sent. III, q. 2, a. 6. 
108 Richard Gillespie, “Robert Holcot’s Quodlibeta,” Traditio 27 (1971), 480-90. 
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would have been given had man not sinned? (10) Whether the hu-
man will in Christ had conformity with the divine willing?, and (12) 
Whether Christ established his resurrection through suitable dem-
onstration?109 Exploring Holcot’s arguments in these questions will 
likely provide a much fuller view of his suitability as a likely oppo-
nent of Wyclif in De Incarnacione.
Wodeham had a reputation as the equal of Scotus and Ockham, 
and as an ardent defender of the latter. There are two sources avail-
able of Wodeham’s thought regarding christology, both arranged in 
accord with the scheme of the Sententiae. The earlier, the Norwich 
lectures of 1329 and 1332 are briefer, but available in a recently pub-
lished edition.110 The later, more theologically complete are the Oxford 
Lectures of 1332, which have yet to be published; William Courtenay 
provides as an appendix to his study of Wodeham a list of questions 
from a reportatio of the Oxford Lectures and from a subredaction of the 
first book of the Ordinalio, showing considerable attention to christol-
ogy.111 Until further work on Wyclif’s predecessors yields fruit, then, 
we will have to settle for a summary of Wyclif’s christology with little 
historical context.
Recently, Richard Cross has suggested a useful means of sorting 
out models for the hypostatic union of God and man in Christ. Some 
approaches, notably Peter Abelard and Thomas Aquinas, involve rec-
ognizing divinity and humanity as being arranged as parts that make 
up the whole Christ. Peter Lombard described three approaches in 
Sententiae 3.6. In the first, the Word clothed Himself with human na-
ture as a man wears a cloak; this is the habitus theory, suggested by 
Augustine. In the second, a man composed of body and soul was as-
sumed by the Word so that he became identical with the Word; this 
is the assumptus homo theory, endorsed by Hugh of St. Victor and An-
selm. In the third, Christ begins to be composed of divinity and (body 
and soul) in a subsistence relation; this appears to have been Lom-
109 Gillespie, p. 487: 2. Utrum Filius Dei assumpsit naturam humanam in unitatem 
suppositi? 4. Utrum historia conceptionis Christi sit in tota vera? 7. Utrum Chris-
tus convenienter redemit genus humanum? 8. Utrum divinitas sit pars Christi? 9. 
Utrum Christus incarnatus  fuisset dato quod homo non peccasset? 10. Utrum volun-
tas humana in Christo fuit divinae voluntati conformis? 12. Utrum Christus probavit 
resurrectionem suam convenientibus argumentis? 
110 Adam Wodeham, Lectura Secunda. 
111 See William Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 183-209. See also Rega Wood, 
“Adam Wodeham,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 77–85. 
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bard’s approximation of the position of Gilbert of Poitiers.112 Aqui-
nas understood both the habitus and the assumptus homo position as 
having been condemned by Pope Alexander III in 1170 and 1177, and 
supposed any theory in which Christ’s Humanity is described as ac-
cident to have been heretical. Others, including Bonaventure, Giles of 
Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Scotus, use a “substance-accident” model, 
in which Christ’s Humanity is related to the Word as an accident or 
property is related to its substance. Ockham’s ontology, in which a 
nature like “Humanity” is a concept naturally referring to a concrete 
individual or individuals, denies any sort of further reality to what 
his predecessors called universals.113 Given Wyclif’s endorsement of 
a richer realist ontology than most pre-Ockham theologians would 
have dared embrace, it will likely be best to see him as reacting pri-
marily against Ockham’s ontology, using the Scotist “substance-acci-
dent” model for his more full-bodied ontological articulation of Hu-
manity being assumed by the Word.
3.2. What makes a Man? De composicione hominis as Prologue
R. W. Southern describes Robert Grosseteste’s De cessatione legalium 
as being a much more profound expression of medieval humanism 
than Anselm’s Cur Deus homo, despite its much more abstract argu-
ment. This is because Grosseteste envisioned the Incarnation differ-
ently than Anselm; it is not rooted in man’s having sinned beyond any 
other form of redemption, but instead is the “final act in the unfolding 
drama of creation: it made Man and Nature complete, and it bound 
the whole created universe together in union with God.”114 Grosse-
teste is notable for having argued that the Incarnation would have oc-
curred even had man not sinned, on the reasoning that the Incarnation 
benefits all creation, and to make its occurrence a response to sin gives 
112 Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Sco-
tus (Oxford, 2002), pp. 1–26. See Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy 
in the Twelfth Century (Leiden, 1982), pp. 193ff. for detailed discussion of the 
period’s christology. For Lombard’s christology, see Colish, pp. 398-470; also 
Rosemann, pp. 118-43. 
113 Ockham’s approach is best described, I believe, in terms of what today is 
called trope nominalism. See my “William Ockham and Trope Nominalism,” 
Franciscan Studies 55 (1998), 105-20. 
114 R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism (New York, 1970), p. 49. Reference is to 
Robert Grosseteste, De cessatione legalium, c. 1235. 
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it a comparatively diminished place in the order of creation.115 If we 
were to assume that Wyclif’s title, De Incarnacione, is meant to evoke 
a primarily Anselmian Christology, we would be very mistaken. An-
selm’s account in De Incarnacione Verbi contains very little about what 
human nature entails, and how it can be assumed by the Word, while 
Wyclif’s account focuses almost exclusively on this subject. Again, An-
selm argues extensively for substitutionary atonement in Cur Deus 
homo, emphasizing man’s great unpayable debt to God, while Wyc-
lif says comparatively little on the subject.116 Wyclif’s understanding 
of the Incarnation is more similar to Grosseteste’s, who was known as 
much for his careful scientific understanding of the created world as 
for his theological acumen.117 Hence, Wyclif’s conception of the onto-
logical make-up of the human person deserves our attention before we 
can understand how he envisioned the Word becoming a man.
Wyclif likely wrote De composicione hominis in 1372, the same year 
as De Incarnacione.118 He gives three reasons for approaching the sub-
ject matter: moral theory relies on a clear understanding of the rela-
tion of soul to body, knowledge of this relation of soul to body is the 
key to understanding the more subtle elements of the faith, and the 
relation provides insight into what just human dominium entails. Of 
these, only the second reason figures in the treatise, and straightaway 
Wyclif proceeds to the kind of mereological concern that D. P. Henry 
mentioned. Scripture shows us, Wyclif argues, that the human soul is 
a created spirit itself indivisible, able to be unified to a body, which 
115 See James McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 2000), pp. 127-30. 
116 De Incarnacione 6, ed. E. Harris (London, 1886), p. 90 contains his assertion, 
following Anselm, that because a member of the genus man sinned, a member 
of the genus would have to redeem that sin. But this is an aside in his explana-
tion as to how Christ is really man. 
117 Wyclif cites Grosseteste not at all in De composicione hominis, ed. Rudolf Beer (Lon-
don, 1904), but frequently in De Materia et Forma and elsewhere. A study of Wyc-
lif’s theological anthropology in light of Grosseteste’s thought would be useful. 
118 Note that neither of these treatises are included in the traditional contents 
of the Summa de ente. Robson describes the arrangement of the Summa’s trea-
tises as being first to explicate the metaphysical basis for Wyclif’s theology and 
second to treat the range of questions commonly discussed at Oxford. He de-
scribes DCH as a “conflation of Wyclif’s opinions on universals and the Trin-
ity and Incarnation, which he had expressed more fully elsewhere.” (Robson, 
p. 139) I think it better to consider DCH and DI as complementary works, and 
would argue that envisioning Wyclif as emulating Grosseteste’s theological 
anthropology would help considerably in reversing Beer’s and Robson’s low 
opinion of DCH’s relative worth. 
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union results in the integrated human being. Both Augustine and An-
selm say that just as the divine essence is a trinity of three singular 
natures, so in the Incarnation, the same person is three distinct na-
tures—divine nature, human soul, and a body. And by this, it is clear 
that a man is soul, flesh, and the union of the two. Such a trinity must 
be unavoidable, the aggregate of (body + soul), which Wyclif calls the 
integrated nature, having ontological status commensurate to the two 
considered in themselves.119 
The created spirit, or soul, animating our corporeal body is what 
allows us foothold on the horizon of eternity; according to its lower 
nature, directed to the body, what is real is what is sensible, while ac-
cording to its higher nature, directed to eternal truths, the reality of 
intelligible forms shines through.120 Soul differs from uncreated spirit 
in three ways. First, the uncreated spirit is the prime creating essence, 
while the other is accidental to that creator. Second, uncreated spirit 
is the Word, having being from itself, while created spirit has being 
from another. Finally, uncreated spirit is beyond all single natural 
laws, while the created spirit is subject to these laws. The Incarnation 
did not involve the uncreated spirit assuming a created spirit. “[T]he 
divine word is said significantly actively to assume a body for itself, 
not a human spirit, but a human body, which God in the eternal plan 
had provided that it be joined hypostatically to His creature …“121
He reports Moderni critics of his position as responding with the ar-
gument, “This man is this incorporeal nature, this man is this corporeal 
nature, therefore the incorporeal nature is the corporeal nature.” Con-
fusing identities in numeration across ontological boundaries, Wyc-
lif retorts, is the cause of constant misunderstanding for these philoso-
phers, commenting that he has dealt with the philosophical grounding 
for the proper understanding of identity in De universalibus.122 
119 Wyclif refers the reader to De Civitate Dei 13.24.2. 
120 DCH 1, p. 8.9-18. The phrase “in orizonte eternitatis” is from Liber de causis 2, 
n. 22; for earlier use of the phrase in describing the soul’s place, see Thomas 
Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. V. A. Guaglairdo, C. R. Hess, 
and Richard Taylor (Washington, D.C., 1996), p. 17. 
121 DCH 1, p. 9/6-10: “[E]t hinc verbum divinum dicitur significanter active as-
sumere sibi corpus, spiritus autem humanus non sic, sed corpori, quod deus 
eterno consilio disponit a suo creatore ypostatice copulari …“ 
122 DCH 1, p. 10/19. Reference is to Tractatus De universalibus 1; see Paul Spade’s 
“Introduction,” especially his discussion of Wyclif’s theory of identity and dis-
tinction, and his theory of predication in John Wyclif, On Universals, Anthony 
Kenny, trans. (Oxford, 1985), pp. xx-xli. 
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For just as the nature of the universal is any of its supposits or singulars, 
which are united in that common being, thus the same singular thing is 
certainly distinct in itself, which is united with all in the same supposit 
of species; as any man is a spiritual nature who has a soul; he is the same 
corporeal nature or essence, who has a human body, and these two are 
incommunicably distinct. And he is a third nature from body and soul 
integrated, which is distinguished from both and so, if he wish the first 
truth, any human person, since he, as man, is completely six and di-
visible and thus the most perfect prime under the Sun. For by reason 
of soul he is three, namely memory, reason and will; and by reason of 
body, which is another qualitative composite part, it appears just as the 
soul to be three supposits, namely matter, form and their connection. 
Seven then, as there were seven days in the production of the world, 
God resting in singular and miraculous new man our Jesus Christ, who 
with these six would be essentially creator, will be seven …123
So given that Jesus is seven, every human being is six; three natures 
(two incomplete and one integrated), and numerically six because the 
soul has three parts, namely memory, reason, and will. Considered 
further, man is tenfold, just as the total universe is made up of ten cat-
egories: three natures [formal/spiritual, corporeal, and the combina-
tion], six things of two incommunicable natures [three of formal/spiri-
tual, i.e. capable of understanding spiritual things, able to be beatified, 
and able to inform the body, and three of material, namely minimally 
cognitive, removed from beatification, and able to be formed] and the 
integration of all these nine which is the common singular person. The 
123 DCH 1, p. 11/2-23: “Nam sicut natura universalis est quodlibet surorum sup-
positorum vel singularium, que in illo communi quodammodo uniuntur, sic 
eadem res singularis est valde disparia, que omnia uniuntur in eodem sup-
posito speciei, ut quilibet homo est natura spiritualis, cui accidit esse animam; 
est iterum natura vel essencia corporea, cui accidit esse corpus humanum, et 
hec duo incommunicabiliter sunt distincta. Et est tercio natura ex corpore et 
anima integrata, que distingwatur ab utraque et sic, si prima veritas velit, que-
libet persona hominis, cum sit homo integer sex et divisim et sic primus perfec-
tus numerus sublunaris. Nam racione anime est tria, scilicet memoria, racio et 
voluntas; et racione corporis, quod est altera pars compositi qualitativa, vide-
tur eciam sicut anima supposita esse tria, scilicet materia, forma et earum con-
nexio. Septimo autem, tamquam septimo die produccionis materiarum mundi, 
deus quiescens in singulariter ac mirabiliter novo homine domino nostro Jesu 
Cristo, qui cum ad ista sex sit creatrix essencia, erit septem et per consequens 
omnes vices creature beatificabiles in se tam efficaciter beatificans quam eciam 
objective.” Compare Christ as seven to the Incarnation as seventh day in Gros-
seteste quoted in note 1:19. 
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nature composed of these two incommunicable natures is distinct from 
both considered in themselves. It is a quantity arising from the actual-
izing power of form on the potential quantity of matter, which should 
be distinguished as different in kind from both, just as substance is 
something distinct from the form and matter composing it.
Scripture tells us of the different natures contained within a man; 
sometimes, the term “man” refers principally to a soul (Col. 3:10), 
sometimes, to a body (2 Cor. 4:16), and sometimes to the integrated 
combination of the two, which philosophers understand to refer to ra-
tional animal as composite of body and soul. In a fourth way, Scrip-
tures refer to Christ as man, alternating between the previous senses 
while still referring to the same God-man.
[F]or the person or for the substance, which is any of these three na-
tures or things, or indeed all beings contracted [together], which is each 
of them, and in this way the faith speaks from Scripture that this Man, 
who created heaven and earth, was born of a virgin, conversed with 
men, suffered, died, and was buried, descended to hell, and ascended 
etc. Not according to the assumed nature did He create the kingdom, 
nor according to Deity did He suffer, nor according to His soul was He 
dead and buried, nor according to His body or other integrated nature 
did He descend to hell, but since the same person was all these, accord-
ing to one of these He did one, and according to another He did the 
rest, just as it was best suitable.124
In a similar fashion Paul refers to his own mystical experience in 2 
Cor. 12:3 as something that happened, but Paul is not sure whether it 
was to himself as ensouled body, or as an extra-corporeal being; yet, 
124 DCH 1, p. 18/3-22: “[Q]uarto modo accipitur homo prop persona vel pro sub-
stancia, que est quelibet istarum trium naturarum vel rerum vel eciam omne 
ens contraccius, quod est aliqua earundem; et isto modo loquitur fides ex testi-
monio scripture, quod ille homo, qui creavit celum et terram, fuit natus de vir-
gine, conversatus cum hominibus, passus, mortuus et sepultus, descendit at 
inferos et ascendit etc. Non autem secundum naturam assumptam creavit sec-
ulum nec secundum deitatem paciebatur, nec secundum animam fuit mortuus 
et sepultus, nec secundum corpus aut aliam naturam integram descendid ad 
inferos, sed cum eadem persona fuit hec omnia, secundum aliquid fecit unum, 
et secundum aliud fecit reliquum sicut optime congruebat; et sic loquitur 2 ad 
Cor. 9 de se ipso: Scio, inquit, hominem huiusmodi sive in corpore, sive extra 
corpus nescio, deus scit, quoniam raptus est in paradisum. Ecce quod scivit se 
esse raptum et nescivit se in illo raptu esse se corpus vel animam; ideo sequi-
tur, quod scivit se esse commune ad corpus et ad animam.” The reference is in 
fact to 2 Cor. 12:3. See also Trialogus 2.7. 
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Wyclif argues, the term “hominem” refers accurately to Paul, in what-
ever state he experienced paradise.
If body and soul are distinct from one another, what provides the 
formal basis for accidents for the body that lacks a soul? Wyclif ar-
gues for the existence of a corporeal form present in the body prior to 
ensoulment, but this causes the problem of there being two possible 
ontological beings contained in one person. One being, a body with a 
corporeal form considered as such, is distinct from the ensouled inte-
grated man, yet the two are not truly distinguishable, Wyclif argues, 
because these coextensive bodies communicate equally in the same 
material essence. This rules out the possibility of an infinite regress of 
distinguishable essences.
The soul’s relation to the body is that of an exemplary form es-
sentially extrinsic to the body that conserves through its virtues the 
“complexional form” of the body just as luminosity continually con-
serves light.125 The soul requires the pre-existence of the body since its 
chief act is to animate a body, but not necessarily a temporal priority. 
In one way, the body causes the soul as material cause, but in other 
ways, the soul causes the body as final and efficient causality. What of 
formal causality? The body considered in itself has corporeal formal-
ity apart from the formal causality of the soul, which presumably im-
parts humanity to the body.126
It appears more likely that ‘this man’ communicates more than ‘this 
body and this animal’ for it communicates ‘this spirit’, which remains 
human spirit existing as such, even when it no longer remains a body 
or an animal. It is not the case that these two [spirit and body] are the 
same animal or the same body in number, for the prior corporeal nature 
is a body and yet is not thereby an animal. Since man is all three [body, 
soul, integrated body + soul], he exists, after his body is dead, by virtue 
of the prior corporeal nature, and he is a composite, prior to being an 
animal, according to his corporeal nature and the soul.127
125 DCH 3, p. 46/9: “conservans lumine suarum virtutum formam complexion-
alem corporis.” 
126 This is consonant with De universalibus 3, p. 71/20-35. 
127 DCH 3, p. 48/10-22: “Ulterius tamen pro materia videtur michi probabiliter 
posse dici, quod iste homo plus communicatur quam hoc corpus vel hoc an-
imal; nam iste homo communicatur isti spiritui, cum manet homo spiritu per 
se existente, quando non manet animal sive corpus; et sic negatur, quod ista 
duo sunt idem animal vel corpus idem in numero; nam prior natura corporea 
est corpus et non animal … homo autem, cum communiter sit ista tria, est post 
corpus mortuum secundum naturam priorem corpoream, et prius animal se-
cundum naturam ex corpore et anima complete compositam.” 
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The obvious criticism is to hold that Wyclif might as well be saying 
that if this soul is this body because of the being of this person, one 
can as easily say that a man is an ass, or that deity is humanity be-
cause Christ is a human person. He refers the reader to De universal-
ibus wherein he demonstrates that if this argument were allowed to 
proceed, anything could be anything, which cannot be so.128 Yet the 
paralogism “God is divine,” “Christ is creature,” therefore “God is 
creature” is not as easily addressed.
Deity is essentially, but not formally, a man. I say essentially because 
the essence of our Lord Christ which He has eternally before assum-
ing man, is deity, and this Person is man formally, because Humanity. 
And this appears to be denying that this deity is animal, body, and sub-
stance or creature, although it might he this [Incarnate Word], which is 
any of these, because through the same He would be substance and un-
created essence, and consequently a creature, which would not follow 
from this, that He is a man, unless He were formally a man, as Christ. 
So although Christ is a man, and this man would be animal and a crea-
ture, still Deity is not a man because of this being—animate Word or 
another creature—but because of this fact—that He is God before being 
any creature.129
This brief discussion on the relation of body and soul in man is meant 
only to show that Wyclif envisioned a coherent picture of human 
being in which to portray his understanding of the Incarnation; the 
reader is advised to look elsewhere for fuller consideration of his phil-
osophical anthropology.130
128 De universalibus 1, p. 9/220: “Et si sophistice instetur ex dictia sequi ‘patrem 
esse Filium’, ‘Hominem esse asinum’ et sic ‘Quidlibet esse quidlibet’—nam in 
qualibet tali propositione eadem essentia significatur per subiectum et praedica-
tum, et hoc sufficit ad praedicationem secundum essentiam, igitur et cetera …“ 
129 DCH 3, pp. 48/30-49/5: “[D]eitas est essentialiter, sed non formaliter homo; 
essencialiter dico, quia essencia domini nostri Jesu Cristi, quam eternaliter ha-
bet ante assumptum hominem, est deitas, et illa persona est homo formaliter, 
quia humanitas. Et sic videtur michi negandum, quod deitas sit animal, cor-
pus et substantia vel creatura, quamvis sit illud, quod est quodlibet istorum, 
quia per idem essent substancia et essencia increata, et per consequens crea-
tura, quod non sequeretur ex hoc, quod est homo, nisi foret homo formaliter, 
sicut Cristus. Ideo, quamvis Cristus sit homo, et ille homo sit animal et per 
consequens creatura, tamen deitas non est homo secundum illud, quod est 
verbum animal vel aliqua creatura, sed secundum illud, quod est deus ante 
quamlibet creaturam.” 
130 See Emily Michael “John Wyclif on Body and Mind,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 64 (2003), 343-60. 
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One final element from De composicione hominis will add to our 
understanding of its place in Wyclif’s christology. While discuss-
ing the relation of corporeal essence to the human form, it occurs to 
Wyclif to address the question of whether Christ’s incarnation pre-
ceded creation, a question common in many Sentences Commentar-
ies.131 Lombard had said, “If you look to the person [of the Word], 
say confidentally that this man has always been; if to the nature of 
man, concede him to have come into being.”132 The priority of the 
created human essence, or humanity as such, to all individual hu-
mans allows us to recognize individual humans as instantiations of 
a universal. Humanity is a universal by community; by virtue of the 
corporeal presence of the created human essence in Adam, all men 
are contained in Adam.
Does this mean that there is a sense in which I pre-exist my pres-
ent existence? In the sense that each being exists in raciones semina-
les contained within first principles being actualized in the earlier cre-
ation, yes, but the level of pre-existence is extremely weak. It is more 
accurate to say that each man exists as intelligible to God, which does 
not posit any pre-existing man, only God’s knowing eternally. This 
addresses the following paralogism: The Word exists before cre-
ation; The Word is human nature, therefore human nature pre-ex-
ists creation. We can recognize that the man Christ Jesus was before 
the world, which He created, but He was not purely a man before the 
world.
There are three differences between how the human nature be-
comes instantiated in a particular man and how the Word became 
man. The nature humanity is united to its particular, and does not 
unite itself; it is passive in this sense, and does not come together 
somehow ahead of time with the soul that will occupy the body, but 
is active in the sense that it acts upon the individual substance real-
izing the nature of the species therein. The Word, on the other hand, 
temporally precedes Humanity, because the Word is that which cre-
ates, then assumes Humanity. It acts upon Humanity, and remains 
the Word while also becoming the integrated whole (Word + Human-
131 This question is the subject of Sentences 3, D. 12, c. 1, and it appears that what 
follows here is Wyclif’s discussion of Lombard’s position. 
132 Ibid., p. 81: “Si igitur ad personam respicias, confidenter dic hominem illum 
semper fuisse; si vero ad naturam hominis, concede eum coepisse.” 
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ity) and each of its parts (the number of which varies, depending on 
how you count the elements and the composites that arise from them, 
as described above.) Thus, the Word takes up a full man [plenum ho-
minem suscepit], as the body through soul and the integrated nature 
through both body and soul. “One can then philosophically concede 
that this man was before all creation, because this person, because of 
His integral excellence, assumed an integrated human nature, so that 
He had Himself.”133
3.3. Christ the Creature and the Triduum
A good general rule to follow in reading Wyclif is to pay close at-
tention to the opening section of any of his treatises; in most cases, 
he provides some sort of vade mecum to guide the reader through the 
generally complicated courses of his reasoning. In the case of De In-
carnacione, he begins by suggesting that many of the difficulties that 
arise in the christologically oriented study of Scripture can be avoided 
by remembering that “there are three incommunicable natures in 
Christ: deity, body, and soul. This is clear in this way. Christ is God 
and perfect man, as supported by the faith: God is wholly deity, and 
the perfect man is wholly as much body as soul.”134 We have just de-
scribed his understanding of what being a man involves: any individ-
ual member of the species is body, soul, and the aggregate (body + 
soul). Christ differs through the addition of Deity to these three com-
ponents, which addition Wyclif will argue in no way effects the truly 
human nature of Christ. Wyclif will argue that the Word assumed not 
a human nature, but Humanity as such. Perhaps the right approach is 
to imagine that Deity, the universal divine nature shared by the per-
sons of the Trinity, needs something more than a human nature to off-
set its magnitude in the Christ: the balance is achieved by the Word’s 
assuming Humanity as such. The questions that result from this are 
interesting. First, if the Word assumes Humanity, does this mean that 
133 DCH 2, pp. 29/30–30/1: “Digne ergo et philosophice est concedendum, quod 
homo ille fuit ante omnem creaturam, quia illa persona, que propter sui excel-
lenciam tam integre assumpsit naturam humanam integram, sic se habuit.” 
134 DI 1, p. 3/6-11: “… Christus sit tres nature incommuicantes: scilicet, deitas, 
corpus, et anima. Patet sic. Christus est Deus et homo perfectus, ut ex fide sup-
ponitur: omnis Deus est deitas: omnis homo perfectus est tam corpus quam 
anima: ergo conclusio.” 
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Christ is involved in every relation with each particular of that uni-
versal? Is Christ somehow attached to each of us?
Wyclif addresses two issues in the first several chapters of De In-
carnacione. Was Christ a creature? What happened to Christ’s human-
ity during the triduum, the period between Good Friday afternoon 
and Easter morning, when tradition holds that Christ harrowed hell? 
The first question, that of the created being of Christ, may seem re-
dundant, given his brief discussion of Christ’s pre-existing creation 
in De composicione hominis 2. Thomas Aquinas addressed this in two 
places. In Summa contra Gentiles 4.48, he argues that Christ must not 
be called a creature, because “in Christ there is no other hypostasis 
or person save that of God’s word, and that is uncreated.”135 So while 
it is certainly true that the Incarnation came into being, such that the 
human nature assumed by the Word was created, to call Christ a crea-
ture without qualifications is incorrect. On the other hand, in Summa 
theologiae 3a Q.3 a.3, he explains that we may speak of the Incarna-
tion “as a matter of it coming about in time that a human nature, in-
volving the existence of a human being, came to be assumed by a di-
vine person.”136 The problem lies in whether by “Christ” we refer to 
the hypostatic union of Deity and Humanity, or to G(s) as that which 
assumes Humanity. If the first, then Christ is a creature, but if the sec-
ond, then He is not. Given Wyclif’s continued emphasis that Christ is 
a creature, it is reasonable to ask whether an Ockhamist christology 
could be construed as denying this. 
We cannot pause to explore Ockham’s christology in any depth, 
but a brief discussion of how Ockham diverges from Aquinas will 
help explain Wyclif’s approach.137 In Summa logica 2, Ockham argues 
that reference to a common nature like humanity in a proposition 
“Socrates is a man” is really reference to Socrates himself, and noth-
ing more. In this kind of statement, Aquinas and Scotus would hold 
that the predication “is a man” of Socrates refers to a common na-
ture, humanity, that can be distinguished from the being of Socrates. 
135 Summa contra Gentiles 4.48, trans. Charles J. O’Neil (South Bend, 1957), p. 207. 
136 Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford, 1992), p. 304, see St 3a, 
Q. 3 a. 3. 
137 See Alfred Freddoso, “Logic, Ontology and Ockham’s Christology,” The New 
Scholasticism, 58 (1983), 293-330, for philosophical assessment of ongoing at-
tempts to accuse proponents of Ockhamist nominalism of being unable to 
present a coherent Christology. 
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For Aquinas, the distinction is real, and occurs naturally in our un-
derstanding, and for Scotus, the distinction is formal between the 
common nature Humanity and the haecceity of Socrates. Ockham 
dismisses both, arguing that the humanity arising from predicating 
“is a man” of Socrates is neither something apart from Socrates nor 
is it a part of Socrates. “If it were, then real humanity would have re-
mained in Christ in the tomb, and humanity would have been really 
united to the Word in the tomb, and consequently He would have 
been a man, which is false.”138 Peter Geach argues that this prevents 
Ockham from distinguishing between two propositions: “The man 
Christ began to exist” and “Christ as man began to exist.” Aquinas 
establishes the falsity of the first and the truth of the second in his 
argument in Summa contra Gentiles 4.48, but Ockham, Geach charges, 
cannot. Freddoso argues that, in most cases, the distinction is possi-
ble, but admits that here Ockham is constrained by his theory of ref-
erence. The term “Christ” in the second sentence must supposit for 
G(s) for the sentence to refer properly, and be a true statement, but if 
it does, then Ockham falls into the Arian heresy, implying that G(s) 
began to exist.139
Wyclif appears to suspect this in his attack on Moderni theologians 
who debase the Incarnation through bad metaphysics. “By scholarly 
decline from the logic of the antiqua about universals and right meta-
physics of substantial forms, modern doctors are of one mind in de-
nying that man is a soul, or Christ humanity, and so that Christ is a 
creature, by understanding through the name [autonomatice] Christ 
only according to the excellence that is Christ; and so although they 
grasp the truth, many yet fall away from the logic of Scriptures.”140 
Not only ancient authorities such as Augustine and Jerome, but 
Scripture itself, make clear that when Christ refers to Himself in 
speech in the gospels, it is to Himself as man among men that He 
138 William Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Propositions: Part II of the Summa Logicae, 
trans., Alfred Freddoso and Henry Schuurman, (South Bend, 1980), pp. 87-88. 
139 Freddoso, 1983, p. 302. 
140 DI p. 12/20-27: “[D]eclinante scola ab antiqua logica De universalibus et a 
recta metaphisica de formis substancialibus, negarunt doctores moderniores 
concorditer quod homo est anima, vel Christus humanitas, et consequenter 
quod Christus est creatura, intelligentes autonmatice Christum solum secun-
dum excellentissimum quod est Christus; et sic licet verum concipiant, mul-
tum tamen degenerant a logica scripturarum.“ 
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refers, as well as to God the Son. A familiar picture should by now 
be emerging: in their departure from realist metaphysics and their 
refusal to recognize the right way of reading Scripture, the founda-
tion of all created truth, the Moderns have lost ability to do theology 
properly. While he does not explicitly identify his opponents with 
Arianism, at this point he recounts the Arian heresy, dwelling with 
ghoulish delight on Arius’s ignoble end. He comments that many are 
now free brazenly to deny the literal sense of Scripture where it suits 
them, “saying that God was the Word in name only, and that not all 
things were made through Christ but all things this side of Him, and 
so He is a god and creature, but neither the God of gods nor a crea-
ture in the same univocal sense as we are. Even the heretics [of old] 
are not so sophisticated, not denying Scripture, as they do today, be-
cause [they were] better founded in logic and metaphysics than are 
our own.”141 Is Wyclif’s criticism that of Geach? Is he saying that 
his opponents’ ontology forces them to use the term “Christ” in an 
Arian manner? He continues by warning that Eutychism (a species of 
Monophysite heresy) and Nestorianism loom as real threats for the 
theologian who, committed to this ontology, attempts to avoid Ari-
anism. That is, the ontological reduction of the Moderni force them to 
refer to Christ as only having a divine nature, which was the Mono-
physite position. If He has two natures, then their ontology presses 
them to understand Christ as having assumed a pre-existent human 
being, which he understands to be Nestorian. 
Recall that in De composicione hominis, Wyclif describes the dis-
tinction between corporeal form in the inanimate body and the soul 
as form for the human being. He was by no means the first to do 
this; Matthew of Aquasparta (d. 1302) had argued for the plurality 
of forms in animate substance in response to Aquinas’s assertion 
that the intellectual soul serves as the form for the human being.142 
141 DI p. 21/14-23: “Scio tamen quod protervus postest, ut hodie, negare qua-
mlibet partem scripture de virtute sermonis, et dicere quod Deus erat verbum 
nuncupative, et quod per Christum non sunt omnia facta sed omnia citra ip-
sum, et sic est Deus ac animatus, sed nec Deus deorum nec animatus nobis-
cum univoce. Sed non sic sophisticati sunt eciam heretici, non sic negantes 
scripturam ut hodie, quia melius fundati in logica et methaphisica quam nos-
trates.” See also his earlier [1363?] De Logica Tractatus Tercius 9, p. 123/5-28, 
where he explains that the ancient theologians rightly used Platonism to ex-
plain the relation of uncreated Word to created Christ. 
142 See Cross, pp. 64ff. 
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Ockham made a similar distinction in Quodlibet 2 Q.11, which Al-
fred Freddoso translates as “Is the form by which a human being’s 
body is a body distinct from the sentient soul?”143 Ockham holds 
that the two are distinct; when an animal dies, the same number of 
accidents inhere in the corpse as they did in the living body. They 
can only inhere in a substantial being, which requires both matter 
and form, so there must be some form remaining in the corpse af-
ter the soul leaves. This is the bodily form, or corporeity. Regarding 
Christ’s body during the triduum, “if the corporeity did not differ 
from the sentient soul in a human being, then Christ’s body in the 
tomb would never have been an essential part of the human nature 
in Christ, and the living body and the dead body would not have 
been the same, and the divine nature would not have been united 
to the body in the tomb [on Easter] except through a new assump-
tion, which is absurd.”144 That is, if there were not a real distinction 
between Christ’s sentient soul and His corporeity, then His corpore-
ity—His human bodily form—would not have been an intrinsic part 
of the Incarnation, which would be Docetism. Presumably, Ockham 
means for us to resolve the issue by recognizing that Christ’s corpo-
reity held the fort in the tomb during the triduum while His sentient 
soul descended to hell. 
Wyclif’s problem with this rests in dividing things so neatly: what 
about Christ’s corporeity entails its retaining human bodily form? 
The way Wyclif understands the Moderni position, Christ’s human-
ity cannot leave Christ’s body, nor can it remain. If it descends with 
Christ’s sentient soul, then the corpse is no longer human, no lon-
ger that of Christ, for whom the Incarnation did not cease during 
the triduum. If the humanity does not descend, then G(s) alone de-
scends, which is impossible. It is not that Ockham denies Christ’s lib-
eration of hell in His humanity, but that Wyclif thinks that the Ock-
hamist does not account for the humanity effectively enough. Both 
the body and the soul need to be human, and Ockham’s ontology 
does not provide for that.
So every modern doctor of whose writing I have memory of having 
read, say in agreement that during the triduum the body was the body of 
143 William Ockham, Quodlibetal Questions, trans., Alfred Freddoso and Francis 
Kelley, (New Haven, 1991), 1:136–39. 
144 Ibid., p. 138, interposition mine. 
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Christ just as the soul was then the soul of Christ; because in remaining 
outwardly the union of the Word with the assumed nature, it remained 
the same union. So they say that it is synecdoche [in this case, using the 
whole to refer to the part] to say that they buried Jesus, that is, the body 
of Jesus. But I do not see how it would then be the body of Jesus, unless 
Jesus then were Jesus corporeally, having every part of the body as His 
own parts, according to the voice of Truth, Matthew 26:12, ‘sending this 
ointment here in my body she has made me for burying.’ For certainly I 
believe that the same Christ and every part of His body was buried. 145 
The point is to take the opportunity of this critical period of the Incar-
nation to understand that humanity and divinity remained hypostat-
ically joined. Taking Lombard’s discussion in Bk. 3 D. 22 as his start-
ing point, Wyclif explains that Hugh of St. Victor follows Augustine, 
Scripture, and philosophical reason in arguing that “man” refers to 
body and soul of man, even when the two are separated in death.146 
His formal christology begins here, in his clarification of what re-
mained in the tomb, with endorsement of a modified assumptus homo 
theory of Hugh and Anselm so that the assumed Humanity, a uni-
versal of kind and not an extant man or particularized human nature, 
is united to the Word as accident to substance. That is, he takes up 
the assumptus homo approach and arranges it by the (post-Aquinas) 
substance-accident model using a stronger realism than that counte-
nanced by any of the previous substance-accident theorists.
Given Augustine’s endorsement of the use of the term habitus, it 
would be startling for Wyclif to have adopted the assumptus homo ap-
proach without in some way making the habitus model consonant 
with it. This he does by describing four senses by which the term hab-
itus refers. First, it is acquisition of wisdom, the truth which while not 
145 DI 3, p. 39/10-21: “Unde omnes moderniores doctores, quorum scripta me-
mini me legisse, dicunt concorditer quod in triduo corpus illud fuit corpus 
Christi sicut et anima fuit tunc anima Christi: quia manentibus extremis unio-
nis Verbi ad naturam assumptam, manet eadem unio. Unde dicunt, quod 
est synecdochica locucio, sepelierunt Iesum, id est, corpus Iesu. Sed ego non 
video, quomodo foret tunc corpus Iesu, nisi Iesus tunc foret Iesus corporeus, 
habens omnes partes illius corporis partes suas, iuxta illam Veritatis vocem 
Mt. 26 ‘mittens hec unguentum hoc in corpus meum ad sepeliendum me fecit.’ 
Pro certo ego credo quod ipse Christus sicut et quelibet pars corporis sui sep-
ultus est.” 
146 Si Christus in morte fuit homo in Sententiae 3, D. 22, c. 1, pp. 135-6: “Quibus re-
spondemus quia licet homo mortuus fuerit, erat tamen in morte Deus homo, 
nec mortalis quidem nec immortalis, et tamen vere erat homo.” For Wyclif’s 
endorsement of Hugh, see DI 3 p. 48/17-29. 
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moving, once taken in moves the soul that it informs. Second, it is ac-
quisition of food for nutrients for the body, changing the body that ac-
quires it. Third, the clothing that takes the shape of the wearer’s body, 
and finally, as accoutrements we wear that do not change their shape, 
as with a ring on the finger. The first changes but is not changed, the 
second changes and is changed, the third is changed and does not 
change, and the fourth neither changes nor is changed.147 Further, 
there are two other senses of habitus, of which the first has two parts: a 
quality of the body, as with health, or of the soul, as with the moral or 
intellectual virtues.148 The second is the sense of habitus referred to as 
the tenth Aristotelian category, “which is to have, possession, or hav-
ing, and this habitus is caused by the third and fourth kinds of habi-
tus understood materially: ‘riches’ [what is had] denominates human 
riches, possessions, or having formally.”149
[H]umanity was assumed by the Word as habitus in the third way, since 
it occurred to a being in act, not changing or making into another per-
son He whom it affected. The saints say that humanity is like clothing 
uncovering deity, and the religious who put on Christ have habitus of 
the body; knowing this, that humanity happened to God, but not insep-
arably. Thus says Augustine in his dialogue with Felicianum, that hu-
manity is an accident of the Word, not that it would be a thing inher-
ing as a new kind of accident, since it would be anticipating in created 
substance; neither that it would be coæval with the Word or like a pas-
sion naturally consequent to the subject, but contingently from our time 
it is ineffably in the Word not changing the nature to which it comes, 
but in miraculous form, because the Word of God is identified or hypo-
statically joined: which according to Augustine in the first book of De 
Trinitate, ‘such was the union of incarnation, in which God would have 
made man and man God.’150
147 Augustine, De diversibus quaestionibus 1.73; CCSL 44A, pp. 209-12, see also Pe-
ter Lombard, Sent. 3, D. 6, c. 6 1–5. 
148 Here Wyclif is referring Thomas’s explanation of habits of the body, its sensi-
tive powers, and the soul, and its intellective powers, see Summa theologiae 1.2, 
Q. 50 a. 1-4. 
149 Wyclif’s reference to habicio as the tenth category, instead of to affection, 
which is given in 1b25, is consistent with his list in De universalibus 10, p. 
234/625. 
150 DI 7, p. 119/12-27: “Dicitur ergo quod humanitas assumpta a Verbo est hab-
itus tercii modi, cum accidit enti in actu, non mutans vel faciens ipsam aliam 
personam quam prefuit. Ideo dicunt sancti quod humanitas est quasi vestis 
detegens deitatem; et religiosi, qui Christum induunt, habent habitus corporis; 
hoc notantes, quod accidit Deo humanitas, sed non insearabiliter. Ideo dicit 
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Aquinas rejected both the assumptus homo and the habitus theories 
as leading to Nestorianism in Summa theologiae 3a Q.2 a.6, because 
he understood both as requiring a pre-existing man with whom 
the Word would join. Wyclif argues not for a pre-existing man, but 
for Humanity itself, the universal by community in which all hu-
man beings participate, as that which the Word assumed in hypo-
static union. The universal Humanity is what allows the body in the 
tomb to remain human, and it accompanies Christ to hell in contin-
ued union with the Word. He makes the argument by referring to a 
three-fold distinction in kinds of predication formulated by Bonaven-
ture in his Sentence commentary: actual, aptitudinal/habitudinal, and 
mixed.151 Actual predication is when the subject is being in act, and 
the form is predicated in it, as when man is said to exist in the state-
ment “man is an animal.” Predication by aptitude is when neither 
subject nor predicated form is in act, but necessarily are ordered to 
one another based in a higher principle of nature; no red exists on its 
own in the statement “the flower is red.” When the subject is in act, 
and the predicated form is not actually in it, but according to neces-
sity is ordered as based on a higher principle of nature, this is mixed, 
or part actual, part habitudinal predication. This, Wyclif explains, is 
the sense in which Christ was man during the triduum, “because the 
subject, that is the Word of God, then was in act, and the form of hu-
manity was retained in habitude or aptitude of conjunction of soul to 
body … whoever concedes that body and soul were parts of Christ in 
the triduum, has to concede as a consequence that Christ had human 
being from them.”152
Augustinus in Dialogo ad Felicianum quod humanitas est accidens Verbo, non 
quod sit res inherens ut accidencia novem generum, cum sit precipua creata 
substancia; nec quod sit coeva Verbo vel sicut passio naturaliter consequens 
ad subiectum; sed contingenter ex tempore nobis ineffabiliter inest Verbo 
non mutando naturam, cui advenit, sed formata mirabiliter, quia Verbo Dei 
ydemptificata vel ypostatice copulata: cum secundum Augustinum primo De 
Trinitate, ‘talis fuit unio incarnacionis, que Deum faceret hominem et homi-
nem Deum.’” Reference is to Augustine’s description in De Trinitate, 13 24. 
151 Harris gives reference to Sent. 3, Dist. 22.1. 
152 DI 4, p. 49/17-23: “Et sic concedit quod Christus fuit homo in triduo, quia 
subiectum, quod est Verbum Dei, tunc fuit in actu, et forma humanitatis ser-
vata fuit in aptitudine coniuncciionis anime ad corpus. Nec vidi planiorem 
sentenciam alicuius doctoris in illa materia; quia indubie, quicunque concedit 
quod corpus et anima fuerunt partes Christi in triduo, habet concedere conse-
quenter quod Christus habet correspondenter esse hominis ex eisdem.” 
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It might be objected that Wyclif’s assertion that Christ was univo-
cally man among men can be used to establish change in the Word in 
experience of the passion.153 The answer lies in Wisdom 7:24, “Wis-
dom is more mobile than any motion, because of her pureness she 
pervades and penetrates all things.”154 This truth, combined with Ar-
istotle’s assertion “the motion of the first mover would be the life of 
the living thing” [Physics 8, 6 259b 15] leads Wyclif to assert, “this 
Wisdom is the first mover in efficacy and dignity in accordance to the 
assumed Man, by means of whose very first motion of all the whole 
world, both before and after, is perfected, since any other creature 
through the passion of Christ is renewed to its primary perfection, 
by which it serves God and reconciles men to God.”155 In the only 
scholarly article devoted to Wyclif’s christology, Michael Treschow 
suggests that this indicates the absolute centrality Wyclif attributes 
to the passion; “[n]ot only did the incarnate Word redeem us from 
our sins through his Incarnation and Passion, but the incarnate Word 
also, with his very motion of Incarnation and Passion, gave life to the 
whole created universe from its very origin, from the beginning.”156 
Wyclif’s assertion illustrates his determination to champion earlier or-
thodoxy over what he sees as contemporary attempts to dodge the 
centrality of Christ in creation.157 Most likely the earlier view most im-
portant to Wyclif was that of Grosseteste, who argued that the Incar-
nation would have been necessary, even had Adam not sinned, as the 
153 DI 6 contains Wyclif’s argument for the univocity of Christ’s humanity. 
152 NRSV translation; “omnibus mobilibus est mobilior sapiencia” is Wyclif’s 
version. 
155 DI 7 p. 107/19-24: “[S]ic verissime sine ficticia illa Sapiencia est primum mo-
bile efficacia et dignitate secundum assumptum hominem, mediante cuius 
motu primo omnium totus mundus ante et post perficitur; cum quelibet alia 
creatura per Christi passionem ad perfeccionem primarium, qua Deo serviret 
placato et homini instauratur. “ 
156 Michael Treschow, “On Aristotle and the Cross at the Centre of Creation: 
John Wyclif’s De benedicta Incarnacione Chapter Seven,” Crux, 33 (1977), 28-37, 
quote p. 33. My thanks are due Prof. Treschow, who kindly sent me a copy of 
this article. 
157 See Bonaventure, Breviloquium 4.4; Anselm, Cur Deus homo 2.16 and 22; 
Thomas Aquinas, SCG 4.22; also Dániel Deme The Christology of Anselm of Can-
terbury (Aldershot, 2003) for discussion of this topic, esp. pp. 209-26 for a con-
temporary approach suggestive of Wyclif’s criticism of the moderni. For Wyclif 
on the timing of the Incarnation in human history, see De veritate Sacrae Scrip-
turae 28, ed. Rudolf Buddensieg (London, 1905-7), 3:128-9. 
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act completing all creation, as already indicated. Compare Wyclif’s ar-
gument with that of Grosseteste in Hexameron 9:
“And on the seventh day God ended his work.” … can be understood 
allegorically to mean that Christ took on flesh in the sixth age and com-
pleted and finished everything. For he brought back all natures as if into 
the unity of a circle, which before the incarnation had not fully returned 
into a circle. For God, insofar as he is God, does not have any nature 
that is common to any creature, or which is said of him and of them in 
a univocal way. But when God became a human being, the God-man 
shared in a nature with the rational creature in a univocal way, and the 
making of the circle was perfect, and the circular return to God was 
joined up.158
3.4. Criticism if the Moderni and Scotus
The Moderni diverge from ancient authority, and hence truth, in 
three ways. First they reject universals, without which Anselm argues 
one cannot understand the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, 
and many other sacraments of faith. “Just as the divine form or nature 
is common to three supposits [i.e. the persons of the Trinity], so every 
nature or specific universal form is common in actuality to all of all of 
its supposits; and the person of the Word is common to the divine na-
ture and hypostatically united to the other two [divine persons] …“159 
The further hypostatic union of the Word with the universal Human-
ity does not result in a further aggregate being, “for the hypostatic 
union, which is the personal identity, makes it that any of the three 
uncommunicated natures [Deity, soul, and body] is fully the same 
common person; although between themselves they are naturally 
distinguished through all the many testimonies of the saints, as with 
Gregory, Augustine, and Anselm.”160 The Moderni do not understand 
158 Robert Grosseteste, On the Six Days of Creation, 9.8, p. 282. 
159 DI 9, pp. 144/30–145/3: “Sicut enim natura vel forma divina est communis 
ad tria supposita, sic omnis natura vel forma specifica universalis in actu est 
communis ad omnia eius singularia; et persona Verbi communis ad naturam 
divinam et alias duas contingenter extranee ypostatice copulatas …“ 
160 DI 9, p. 143/26-31: “Nam unio ypostatica, que est ydemptitas personalis facit 
quod quelibet istarum trium incommunicancium naturarum est plene eadem 
communis persona; licet inter se naturaliter distinguantur per totum ex multis 
sanctorum testimoniis supradictis, ut Augustini, Gregorii, et Anselmi.” Wyclif 
refers the reader to Anselm’s De Incarnacione Verbi 6. The “three uncommuni-
cated natures” refer to Deity, soul, and body, which Wyclif introduces on p. 317. 
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the close tie of personal identity and substantial form, foolishly sup-
posing that corporeity can remain as basis for substantial accidents. 
Wyclif develops his response elsewhere, in De composicione hominis.
Just as Christ is of two forms or natures, namely divinity and humanity, 
so the same person of Peter is corporeity, in which is animality or soul, 
and with this is the immortal spirit, which some call spirituality. And 
just as the Word is of a different sort after it became man, than it was 
when only divinity, so the person of man is something different when 
it is body, than when it is only spirit, which necessarily it is, if he is. 
Nor is it against this corporality to be soul, and yet to be indivisible as 
a mass, since the corporal life is with its way of life, by which the body 
lives formally. So the Apostle in Col. 2:9 says, that in Christ, “resides ev-
ery fullness of divinity corporeally” because (in) Christ, who is a body, 
divinity formally inheres, and fully everything, which inheres in God, 
since He is God. And that corporality is humanity, by understanding 
the term “man,” since it speaks to the union of two natures. Thus, as 
is clear in what follows, the humanity is said in an equivocal fashion 
to employ, where it is shown, that not every other thing makes some 
quiddity, but another complete supposit, which is essential to individ-
ual or person. Nor does it follow, that man would have two humanities, 
of which both are substantial form, but his humanity happens in ani-
mation of the body, with which animation this spirit is identified. And 
from this it is clear, that humanity is to every point of the man accord-
ing to all of him, and not a simple element of corporeity, which same is 
indivisible as a mass.161
161 DCH 5, p. 85/5-86/2: “[S]icut Christus est duarum formarum seu naturarum 
utraque, scilicet divinitas et humanitas, sic eadem persona Petri est corpo-
reitas, que est animalitas et anima, et cum hac est spiritus immortalis, quem 
quidam vocant spiritualitatem. Et sicut verbum est aliud, postquam fuit homo, 
quam fuit quando solum erat divinitas, sic persona hominis est aliud quando 
est corpus, quam est quando est solum spiritus, quod necessario est, si est. Nec 
obest illam corporalitatem esse animam, et tamen esse indivisibilem quoad 
molem, cum vita corporalis sit cum huisumodi vita, qua corpus vivit formali-
ter. Unde Apostolus ad Coll.2 dicit, quod in Cristo ‘habitat omnis plenitudo 
divinitas corporaliter’, quia Cristo, qui est corpus, inest formaliter deitas, et 
plene omne, quod inest deo, ut deus. Et illa corporalitas est humanitas, intel-
ligendo hominem, ut dicit unionem duarum naturarum. Ideo, ut patebit pos-
terius, humanitas dicitur exercere equivoce, ubi ostendetur, quod non omne 
aliud facit aliquam quiditatem, sed aliud suppositale completum, quod est 
essenciale individuo vel persone. Nec sequitur, quod homo habeat duas hu-
manitates, quarum utraque sit forma substantialis, sed humanitati sue accidit 
animacio corporis, cui animacione ille spiritus est ydentificatus. Ex istis patet, 
cum humanitas sit ad omnem punctum hominis secundum se totam, et non 
corporeitas simplicis elementi, quod ipsa est indivisibilis quoad molem.” See a 
condemnation of Moderni attitudes on pp. 102-3 of this treatise as well. 
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The essence of a thing is the same personally as the composite subject, 
as the intellective soul of man, which is its humanity, is the same per-
son with the man to which it gives form. Further, the Moderni deny 
predication according to essence, by which Wyclif means that the sen-
tence “Socrates is a man” entails predication of a distinct nature, Hu-
manity, of the individual Socrates.162 Finally, in their philosophical 
error they veer into the absurd, considering possibilities such as the 
Incarnation of the Word in non-human form. “Nor do I see how He 
could have assumed the nature of a pig, or a serpent, or some other 
creature than a man. For if one of these could be monstrous, He cer-
tainly could have been a chimera or a goatstag with the head of an 
ass, the tail of a horse, the mane of a lion. He would in so doing most 
truly not have been our Jesus … It is empty and dangerous to assert 
such things.”163 As we will see, this criticism applies not only to Ock-
hamists, but they do define Wyclif’s philosophical response to Ock-
hamist thought, although the identity of his opponents remains un-
clear.164 Turning from his arguments against Moderni theologians, 
Wyclif believes his own approach is best explained in light of the 
model Scotus provided.165
162 For an explanation of Ockham’s ontological parsimony in his predication the-
ory, see Alfred J. Freddoso, “Ockham’s Theory of Truth Conditions,” in Ock-
ham’s Theory of Propositions: Part II of the Summa Logicae, pp. 1-77; Gyula Klima, 
“Ockham’s Semantics and Ontology of the Categories,” in The Cambridge Com-
panion to Ockham, pp. 118-42. 
163 DI 4, p. 65/9-16: “Nec video quomodo posset sumpsisse naturam porci, serpen-
tis, vel alterius creature quam hominis, ut patet posterius. Nam si aliquid po-
tuisset esse monstrum, potissime fuisset chimera vel tragelaphus habens caput 
asininum, caudam equinam, pectus leoninum. Et sic esset veracissime de Iesu 
nostro … Vacuum ergo et periculosum est raciones tales asserere.” For the in-
tention of Ockham’s speculation in this vein, see Oberman, Harvest, pp. 255-9. 
164 Adam Wodeham seems a good beginning place. William Courtenay provides a 
useful list of Adam’s extant christological thought in his Adam Wodeham, pp. 194-
5. The incipits he provides from Adam’s Reportatio et Ordinatio Oxoniensis sug-
gest attention to Christ’s knowledge, its relation to divine knowledge, its capac-
ity to know future contingents, and His ability to know the smallest corporeal 
part of His physical body. This last question, 3, Q. 11, might prove of particular 
interest for evidence of a position against which Wyclif would have argued. 
165 Wyclif indicates that he has used an “abreviator” of Scotus, “Cowtonus” in 
his assessment of the Subtle Doctor’s Christology. This was Robert Cowton, 
an English Franciscan educated in Paris before 1315. Cowton was a contem-
porary of Scotus, but more inclined to the theology of Henry of Ghent. His 
Sentences commentary was later abbreviated by Richard Snettisham and was 
widely used as a secondary source during Wyclif’s period at Oxford. See Wil-
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Scotus rejects Aquinas’s view in which the human nature shares in 
the existence of the divine person as a concrete part of a thing shares in 
the existence of the substantial being of the thing, because it suggests 
Christ’s human nature was a constitutive part of the second person of 
the Trinity, a part perfected by the nature of the Word.166 This seemed 
to Scotus to verge on the monophysite heresy. Rather than consider 
Christ’s humanity as a part of the Word’s being, Scotus followed the 
approach of many, such as William of Auxerre, who viewed the rela-
tion as like that holding between accident and substance. He identi-
fied two characteristics of accident’s relation to substance; a substance 
has a passive potentiality to take on an accident, and the accident, in 
turn, depends on that substance. 
Consider the possibility of becoming blue. Right now, you are 
not (presumably) blue. Nor am I. We each have the possibility of be-
ing made blue, being coated with blue paint, or stained by some dye; 
this corresponds to the passive potentiality of the substance. But my 
possible blue is not your possible blue. The blue I might become is 
mine, and depends on my being, while the blue you might become 
is yours, and depends on your being. Should I cease to be, the blue I 
might become will never be, although yours might still come into be-
ing. This illustrates the dependence relation of the accident upon the 
substance; it’s being is not anything that affects the being of the sub-
stance. Should I become blue, my substantial being will be the sup-
port for the being of the blue, which is particularly mine. 
The analogy is between the being of the Word and substance, and 
the possibility of becoming human and blue. In each case, Scotus, ar-
gues, the being of the accident has a dependence relation on the be-
ing of the substance that does not correspond to a correlate relation 
in the substance. “Thus Scotus is quite clear that sufficient for the di-
vine person’s being human is the actualization of the human nature’s 
potentiality for dependence … we will have to accept by stipulation 
that a substance x can have a property F merely in virtue of F’s rela-
tion to x.”167 Cross’s comment underscores his puzzlement about how 
a thing can acquire an accident without itself being affected; in my 
example, if my possible blueness is actualized, I become blue. That 
liam Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, 187, 189, 364. Also, H. Theissing, Glaube 
und Theologie bei Robert Cowton OFM (Münster, 1969). 
166 St 3a, Q. 2 a. 6, as described in Cross, Duns Scotus, pp. 114-16. 
167 Cross, ibid., p. 117, italics his. 
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Christ’s human nature’s potentiality for dependence is actualized is 
all that is required: “It is not necessary for a mutation to have existed 
in anything said to have been made such, but only in that on account 
of whose passive change something is said to be made such; and here 
that was only the human nature.”168 Briefly, the metaphysics of the 
blueness being made real does not entail accounting for the possibil-
ity of the substance becoming blue.
Directing all the attention on the individuality of the accident, 
and making the human nature of Christ into something having 
metaphysical properties seems to open one to Nestorianism, the her-
esy that held there to have been two separate persons in Christ, one 
human and one divine. To avoid this, Scotus and the many other 
adherents of the substance-accident approach, had to argue that 
Christ’s human nature does not count as a person. To do this, Cross 
describes two approaches. First, one might argue the need for some 
further positive feature that needs to be added to the “accident” of 
“human nature” to make it a person, and second, one might argue 
that a person is different from a nature by virtue of something the 
nature lacks, and not something the person has. Scotus opts for the 
second approach, since the first suggests that Christ’s human na-
ture is something less than everyone else’s human natures. The sec-
ond approach holds that being a person is a negative property of 
a nature. This seems the counterintuitive approach, but for Scotus 
it is the only way of treading the middle ground between Nestori-
anism and the Monophysite heresy, and it ends in arguing that all 
human nature, from creation onwards, has a negative property, an 
empty space, the express purpose of which is to allow the Incarna-
tion. When this negative property is realized, instead of that human 
nature being a person, it inheres in a substance, the Word, without 
being a separate or separable person.
[T]he assumed nature [i.e. Humanity] has two habitudes to the Word, ei-
ther by reason of causation as generally every creature depends on the 
whole Trinity, and this habitude presupposes in the creature a natural 
capacity suggesting imperfection, which must have the divine causal 
act inseparably with it. The second habitude is [that] by which the as-
sumed nature can be the nature of the Word according to obediential 
power, and this power can not be actualized save by miracle, and be-
speaks a certain perfection in the person assuming; to terminate thus 
168 Ibid., quotation from Ord. 3.7.2, n. 6. 
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the created dependence according to this reason is hypostatically to as-
sume said creature.169
Wyclif follows Scotus in adopting the substance-accident model in 
which [Substance : Accident : : Divine Nature : Human Nature] is the 
analogy for explaining the Incarnation of the Word. In this model, 
Scotus describes the relation of accident to substance as having two 
aspects, namely a relation of ordering and one of ontological depen-
dence. Every creature has a causal dependence to God, so the causal 
relation is not a good model for explaining the human nature’s rela-
tion as accident to the divine nature’s substance. Every created nature 
has that relation. The hypostatic union is a union of order of depen-
dence because the relation holding between the Word and human na-
ture is a property of the human nature—of the “accident”—that lacks 
a corresponding property in the Word that would make the relation 
mutual. So the hypostatic union is a non-mutual, one-sided relation 
that boils down to a created dependence on uncreated Being struc-
tured on something other than causation.170
The reference Scotus makes to actualizing this power by miracle 
naturally calls to mind other possibilities that might have been mirac-
ulously realized in the Incarnation. We have already noted Wyclif’s 
scorn for contemporaries who stray into speculation about the Word 
having assumed a non-human form, which would have been possible 
de potentia absoluta, by God’s absolute power. The terms potentia ab-
soluta and potentia ordinata were, by the time of Aquinas, recognized 
as useful in distinguishing between divine ability considered in the 
abstract and divine ability as actualized in creation.171 The use of this 
distinction acquired political baggage in the 1290s, when conflict be-
tween the pope and mendicant friars introduced the distinction into 
arguments about the extent of papal authority. Scotus continued to 
use the distinction, despite having acknowledged this troublesome 
mutation in its applicability.172 This opened the door to his follow-
169 Here, DI 11, p. 185/5-23, Wyclif quotes Ordinatio 3.d.1.1; Wadding 7.6. 
170 See Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, pp. 121-4 for a careful explana-
tion of Scotus’s distinction to which Wyclif alludes here. 
171 William Courtenay, Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Abso-
lute and Ordained Power (Bergamo, 1990); for Aquinas, see pp. 88-89. 
172 Hester Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Do-
minican Theology at Oxford 1300-1350, (Leiden, 2004), p. 313, n. 9; reference is to 
Scotus’s Ordinatio 1.44, in Opera Omnia ed. Charles Balic (Vatican City, 1963), 
6:363/17-364/10. 
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ers’ using the distinction to generate possible divine courses of action 
within creation outside the purview of potentia ordinata. 
In 1315, regent masters of theology at Oxford condemned several 
positions making use of the distinction in generating counterfactuals. 
While not condemning use of the distinction, this effectively limited 
the scope of possible scenarios theologians might generate.173 The dis-
tinction figured again in 1324-28, during the Avignon commission’s 
investigation and ultimate condemnation of Ockham. Among those 
most closely following the Scotist approach were the Dominicans at 
Oxford. Their approaches varied, but two friars in particular sub-
jected ideas in which the distinction figured to careful propositional 
analysis of the kind that continued to flourish during Wyclif’s time. 
Hugh Lawton and Robert Holcot used analysis of sentences describ-
ing God’s knowledge, willing, and action modified by the distinction 
to tease modal subtleties out of problematic statements. Hugh Law-
ton tended to avoid innovation in summoning hypothetical instances 
of God’s intervening in the created order, but Holcot boldly ven-
tured into this territory, wielding his propositional analysis to engage 
in real innovation. “Holcot’s integration of the vocabularies and log-
ics of contract, of obligatio, and of covenant create a sophisticated new 
context for understanding the deployment of divine power.”174 We 
cannot yet say whether Wyclif’s indictment of those who would dab-
ble in hypotheticals de potentia absoluta are directed at Holcot, or some 
or all of his followers, as texts identifiable with Dominican authors at 
Oxford in the generation after Holcot and Black Death have yet to be 
edited. Elsewhere, he writes
[T]he power of God appears to me to be the highest and greatest and 
as such self- limited and defined, because other powers are defined 
through it, though it limits itself through itself … indeed He limits Him-
self insofar as being able, with respect to understanding of extrinsic 
things in which He can and in which He cannot [act]. But want of abil-
ity or a limitation in distinguishing between that which He can [do] and 
that which He cannot [do] appears to be a place of scholastic exercise in 
truth or the endless, although to Him it would be most manifest how 
much He can [do].175
173 Courtenay, Capacity and Volition, pp. 100-120. 
174 Gelber surveys the rich theological variety of Dominican use of the distinction; 
see It Could Have Been Otherwise, pp. 309-49. Citation, p. 339. for the full flavor 
of Holcot’s analysis, see Robert Holcot, Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on 
Future Contingents, ed. Paul Streveler and Katherine Tachau (Toronto, 1995). 
175 De Actibus Anime 3, in Miscellanea Philosophica vol. 1, ed. M. H. Dziewicki (Lon-
don 1902) pp. 109/34-110/8: “[P]otentia dei videtur mihi esse summe et maxime 
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3.5. Christ Assumed Everyman
Up to this point, it would be understandable to ask in frustra-
tion just what Wyclif conceived the Incarnation to involve. His argu-
ments about the triduum suggest antipathy for a Moderni approach, 
although whose is by no means clear. He seems to agree with the Sco-
tistic approach, but only in a limited way; nowhere does he give ev-
idence of agreeing with the Scotistic conception of individuation, in 
which common nature and haecceity define the self. Rather than ad-
dress Scotus head on, he appears to veer off into a prolonged discus-
sion as to whether the Word could have assumed many humanities 
at once or successively, noting that Aquinas thought that if the Word 
had assumed many humanities, He would be many men.176 Wyc-
lif’s response is to argue that the Word assumed the common nature 
Humanity, a universal having ontological priority to any of its cre-
ated particulars. “If He were to have assumed all humanities, then He 
would be one man as such, as the most recent writers have asserted 
truly enough.”177
Readers of medieval literature will be familiar with the play “Ev-
eryman,” in which the eponymous character, who represents all hu-
man beings, goes from carefree ignorance of his place in creation to 
an awareness of his need for good deeds and the sacraments through 
the agency of Death. Death says, “Every man I will beset that liveth 
beastly / Out of God’s laws, and dreadeth not folly. … Lo, yonder I 
see Everyman walking; / Full little he thinketh on my coming …“178 
Wyclif begins his discussion of the metaphysics of the Incarnation 
in Chapter 13 by making a jump similar to the one Death has just 
made. He argues that if every man would be Everyman, then he [Ev-
et per se finita et limitata, quia alie potencie finiuntur per illam, et illa per se finit 
se, sicud patet per theologos concedentes ternarii suppositum esse finem bina-
rii prioris suppositorum; immo finit se quantum ad posse, respectu intelligencia 
extrinsecorum in que potest et in que non potest. Ideo sicud est per se, sic finite 
se per se. Sed inercia vel confinium distinguendi inter illa que potest et illa que 
non potest videtur pro statu opinandi esse scolasticus locus exercitandi in veri-
tate vel demum infinite, quamvis sibi sit manifestissimum quante potest. 
176 DI 12, p. 203; Wyclif cites In Sent. 3, D. 1, a. 8-9, but ignores St 3a, Q. 3, a. 7, wherein 
Aquinas holds that the Word could assume any number of human natures. 
177 DI 13, p. 216/8-12: “Si omnes humanitates assumeret, foret unicus homo tan-
tum, ut recentissimi scribentes asserunt satis vere.” Wyclif does not disclose 
the identity of these recent writers, of course. 
178 Everyman, in Medieval English Literature, ed. J. B. Trapp (Oxford, 1973), pp. 
390-1. 
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eryman] would only be one man, and if Christ assumes Humanity, 
then Christ, too, would be Everyman.179 It cannot be that Christ is 
every man, of course, nor that Christ is more than one man through 
having assumed the universal Humanity, nor can it be that the uni-
versal Humanity is itself a man capable of receiving accidents like 
individual men are. What Wyclif means is that Christ has the same 
kind of body and soul as all other men have. In assuming the uni-
versal, He did not become the being of the universal by which all 
its particulars have their being. There need be no posited haecce-
ity by which individualization occurs for Wyclif, and there need be 
no additional individuating element added to the hypostatic union 
of the Word and Humanity. In assuming Humanity, Christ did not 
thereby assume every relation holding between the universal and its 
particulars.180
A problem arises in that the universal Humanity is not something 
apart from the Godhead, when it is understood as a Divine Idea pro-
viding ontological ground for the instantiation of the form in every 
particular man. How can one person of the Trinity assume an iden-
tity of a particular when the divine essence provides the foundation 
for the universal that defines all particulars? Would not the other two 
persons be changed thereby? Wyclif argues carefully against change 
in G(f) and G(hs) by the Word’s assumption of Humanity, but he 
does not address the former question. He gives evidence of aware-
ness of it by arguing that the Word produces the conditions whereby 
only the Word’s Deity is hypostatically united to Humanity; filiation 
is proper to the Word, and to neither of the other two divine per-
sons, and all the properties of the Word admit of assumption of the 
flesh, but his arguments for the metaphysical means by which occurs 
amount to nothing more than assertion. His concluding paragraphs 
indicate that his intention is to clarify how the term “Christ” has sev-
eral referential schema, depending on the sense in which the term 
demands to be understood.
[S]ome things are in the Word purely insofar as God; others insofar as 
man, and others mixed. Insofar as God, He created the world; insofar as 
179 DI p. 216/13-16: “Nam hoc posito, omnis homo foret omnis homo; ergo foret 
solummodo unus homo. Antecedens patet per exponentes, cum homo Chris-
tus sit omnis homo; ut patet per conversionem, omnis homo est Christus.” 
180 DI 13, p. 220. 
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man, He suffered death; and insofar as God and man, He redeemed man. 
Nor should a reduplicative sign be understood in each way, so that it ex-
presses a formal logical consequence and cause; just as here Christ inso-
far as He is man is a creature but in another way He is cause, so that al-
though He can be God and not have produced the world, yet deity was 
the cause why He produced the world and not His humanity …181
The treatise, then, appears largely to be an effort to show that Moderni 
christology is best addressed by a philosophical attention to language 
with a level of depth defined by the approach of Scotus but a richer 
ontology. At the very simplest level, the Incarnation appears to be the 
Word having assumed the universal Humanity in the human body 
born of the Virgin, the integrated whole person resulting from this be-
ing the creature Christ. Functioning as a human soul would be the hy-
postatic union of Word with Humanity. It is possible that such was 
his plan in 1372; certainly by 1373, when he had begun De dominio di-
vino, the idea still figured in his thought.
... Christ is the subject of theology. For which it was considered that in 
the Word there is a triple unity: first is the unity of essence with Fa-
ther and the Gift, from which John 10, ‘I and the Father are one’; sec-
ond is the unity of supposition in which according to the blessed In-
carnation both natures, namely corporeal and incorporeal, are the same 
Word; third is unity in common nature by which the same and every 
creature are one, since every creature is corporeal and incorporeal, and 
for these two reasons He is communicated to every creature, first ac-
cording to Ideal Reasons, by which everything, although they are dis-
tinct rationally, are the same essentially to the Word of God, and any 
creature is the same essentially with its Idea. And others have declared 
that it does not follow, ‘this Idea is God, because essentially, and this 
same Idea is creature, because accidental to it, therefore this creature is 
God.’ But it well follows that any creature according to its intelligible 
being is God.182
181 DI 13, p. 230/19-28: “[A]liqua insint Verbo pure in quantum Deus; aliqua 
in quantum homo; et aliqua mixtim. In quantum Deus, creavit mundum; in 
quantum homo, passus est mortem; et in quantum Deus et homo, redemit ho-
minem. Nec debet signum reduplicatum intelligi utrobique, ut dicat conse-
quenciam formal logicam et causalem; sicut hic christus in quantum homo est 
creatura; sed et quomodolibet dicit causam, ut licet potest esse Deus et non 
produxisse mundum, tamen deitas fuit causa quare produxit mundum et non 
sua humanitas.” 
182 De dominio divino 1.6, pp. 42/16-43/2: “[Q]uod Christus sit subiectum theol-
ogie. Pro quo considerandum est quod in Verbo est triplex unitas: prima est 
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Wyclif did not turn completely away from philosophical theol-
ogy thereafter; his christology continues to factor into his thought 
throughout the rest of his life. Three examples illustrate this: Christ as 
ideal Lord in his treatises on human dominium, Christ’s identity with 
Scripture in De veritate Sacrae Scripturae, and Christ as the paradig-
matic teacher of the Christian life in Opus Evangelicum and Trialogus. 
Wyclif’s treatises on human justice and its absolute reliance on 
God’s law are ably covered in another chapter, but deserve mention 
because of the centrality of the Incarnation to their argument. Gregory 
XI had condemned Wyclif’s dominium writings in May 1377, decrying 
their expression of the anti-papal monarchism of Marsilius of Padua. I 
have summarized the inaccuracy of this condemnation elsewhere, but 
would add here that Marsilius’ conception of the role Christ has to 
play in the just society is rather less than Wyclif’s.183 For Marsilius, the 
evangelical code of justice as given in the Gospels has less the force 
of a law, and more that of a doctrine. That is, the evangelical teach-
ing cannot be the basis for coercive legislation in civil government, 
but only the doctrinal guide by which civil law ought to be inspired. 
While Christ is indeed the great legislator of salvific law, his heirs are 
priests only, not kings.184 Wyclif, on the other hand, envisioned Christ 
as the paradigmatic just lord in creation, simultaneously just lord and 
loyal servant, as all true civil lords ought strive to be.185 Through His 
restoration of natural dominium in His redemption of mankind and the 
apostolic poverty of the Church, we have the means by which to real-
ize divine justice in civil law. Wyclif’s arguments in De civili dominio 
for the centrality of Christ’s place in the life and teachings of both spe-
unitas essencie cum Patre et Dono, de qua Ioh.X, Ego et Pater unum sumus; 
secunda est unitas suppositalis in qua secundum benedictam incarnacionem 
utraque natura creata, scilicet, corporea est incorporea, est ipsum Verbum; ter-
cia est unitas in natura communi qua ipsa et omnis creatura sunt unum, cum 
omnis creatura sit corporea vel incorporea; et sic duplici racione communica-
tur cuilibet creature, primo secundum raciones ydeales, que omnes, licet dis-
tinguantur racinione, sunt idem essencialiter Verbo Dei, et quelibet creatura 
est eciam idem essencialiter cum ydea. Et alias declaravi, ‘Hec ydea est Deus, 
quia essencialiter, et hec eadem ydea est creatura, quia sibi accidentaliter; ergo 
hec creatura est Deus.’ Sed bene sequitur quod quelibet creatura esse intelligi-
bile sit Deus.” see also ibid., 2.5, p. 198. 
183 See my Philosophy and Politics in the Thought of John Wyclif (Cambridge, 2003), 
pp. 63-7. 
184 Marsilius of Padua, Difensor Pacis 2.9. 
185 De dominio divino 3.6, p. 255/16-21. 
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cies of authority—the civil lord and the evangelical lord—show the 
Incarnation as the source of all just human law.
Shortly after writing De civili dominio, Wyclif began his monumen-
tal treatise on scriptural exegesis De veritate Sacrae Scripturae [1377–
78J. Here he explains the difference between the eternal truth which is 
the real nature of Scripture and the physical books to which we usu-
ally refer with the term “Scripture.” While the books themselves are 
subject to the ravages of time, as are the understandings of individual 
readers, the Truth they embody is eternal. Further, in John 10:35–36 
Jesus teaches that the Scripture cannot be destroyed which God sent 
into the world, which leads Wyclif to conclude that Christ himself is 
that truth, the book whom “God the Father sent … into the world in 
order to save the world … This book cannot be destroyed, precisely 
because the divinity and the humanity are insolubly united in the 
same person in a seven-fold manner.”186 This identity of the Incarnate 
Word with Scripture compels every Christian to study the Bible, the 
very image of Christ.187
At the end of his life, the Incarnation remained central to Wyc-
lif’s thought. In Trialogus 3.27 he describes the three natures united 
in Christ, body, soul and divine nature, just as he had in De Incar-
nacione 1. Here also he warns his lay readers away from the “many 
wasteful studies and occupations by which the heretics are occu-
pied in formulating and developing responses” in arguments about 
the metaphysics of the Incarnation. Far better to concentrate on the 
solid truths Christ Himself teaches.188 To that end, Wyclif’s extended 
study of Christ’s words themselves deserves attention. While much 
of Wyclif’s commentary of Scripture remains unedited, the Wyclif 
Society has published a number of his later gospel commentaries, in-
cluding his extensive analysis of Matthew 5-7, in Opus Evangelicum, 
volumes 1 and 2. Here, in his exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount, 
186 John Wyclif, On the Truth of Holy Scripture, trans. Ian Christopher Levy (Kal-
amazoo, 2001), p. 98. See De veritate Sacrae Scripturae 1.6, p. 109; for the seven-
fold manner in which divinity and humanity are united, see the Grosseteste-
inspired quote in DCH given above, n. 116. 
187 See Ian Christopher Levy, “John Wyclif’s Neoplatonic View of Scripture in its 
Christological Context,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 11 (2003), 227-40. 
l88 Trialogus 3.27, pp. 225-6: “[E]t per hoc exonerati sumus a studiis et occupation-
ibus multis superfluis, quibus circa casus et responsiones haeretici occupantur. 
Salubrius quidem est studere veritates solidas quam inaniter evagari circa fic-
titias …“ 
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likely written in 1383, we find Wyclif’s most sustained argument as 
the ideal code by which any member of the human race ought live.189 
“Just as in any creature a vestige of the Trinity gleams, thus in any 
book of the New Testament, which are books of Christ and the Holy 
Spirit, a certain perfection gleams which is clear in the book to any 
creature; because just as looking carefully at oneself in the mirror re-
veals an image of ones face looking back out, so looking in any par-
ticular part of scripture, one sees the beginning, middle and end 
through which one moves to salvation.”190 While the commentary is, 
in many places, more a patchwork of long quotations from Augus-
tine, Grosseteste, the Opus Imperfectum, and the remarkable De duo-
decim abusivus, it shows Wyclif’s determination that the Incarnation 
and Christ’s teachings serve as the perennial antidote to all that con-
tinues to plague human life. 
189 Opus Evangelicum 4:33. ed. J. Loserth and F. D. Mathew, 2 vols. (London: 1895-
96), 2:368/18-24. 
190 Opus Evangelicum 1, 1:1/20-29: “Sicut enim in qualibet creatura relucet vestig-
ium Trinitatis, sic in quolibet libro novi testamenti, cum sit liber Christi et Spir-
itus Sancti, relucet quecunque perfeccio que patet in libris aliquibus creature; 
quia, sicut intuens se in speculo videt faciei sue similitudinem quotquot spec-
ula intuetur, sic videns quamcunque scripture sacre particulam videt princip-
ium, medium et finem per que tenderet ad beatitudinem adquirendam.” 
